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Abstract
Our work is based on the model proposed in the paper “Optimal Use of Communication Re-
sources” by Olivier Gossner, Pene´lope Herna´ndez and Abraham Neyman, [6]. We propose two
models that consider an alteration of the payoff function in [6]. The general setup is as follows. A
repeated game is played between a team of two players, consisting of a forecaster and an agent, and
nature. We assume that the forecaster and the agent share the same payoff function. The forecaster,
contrary to the agent, is able to observe future states of nature that have an impact on the team’s
payoff. A given pair of strategies for the players induces a sequence of actions and thus implements
an average distribution on the actions of interest, i.e., on those actions that determine the payoff. We
let the team’s stage payoff not only depend on actions played in one stage, but on actions played
in two consecutive stages. We introduce two models that vary w.r.t. the specification of the payoff
function and the actions played by nature, with the aim of characterizing the implementable average
distributions. This characterization is achieved through an information inequality based on the en-
tropy function, called the information constraint. It expresses a key feature of the strategies of the
players, namely the fact that the information used by the agent cannot exceed the amount of infor-
mation sent by the forecaster. In each model we develop an information constraint that characterizes
the implementable distributions as follows. On the one hand, we show that every implementable
distribution fulfills the information constraint. And on the other hand, we prove that a certain set of
distributions that fulfill the designated information constraint is implementable.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this work we consider a repeated game with an asymmetry of information among the players who
share a markovian payoff function. The theory of repeated games took shape in the second half of the
twentieth century. An excellent coverage of the area, in particular of the classic results, is provided by
the work of Mertens, Sorin and Zamir, see [10]. One particular field in the theory of repeated games,
that focuses on the information of the players, originated at the height of the Cold War, namely during
the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union about mutual reductions in their nuclear
arsenals. At that time, no party had concrete information about the other’s arsenals. So the United States
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) turned to the most well-known game theorists of their
time to help with the strategic issues in these negotiations. It was during and after these negotiations that
the first papers on repeated games with an asymmetry of information among the players were written. In
1986, Aumann and Maschler, [1], published their seminal work on this topic. In the model they present,
one player lacks information about the state of nature, whereas the other player is informed about it.
This paper has motivated many research directions. One direction focused on the problem of strategic
information transmission between players with unequal information about states of nature and has been
well studied since. Two notable examples are the papers by Crawford and Sobel, [3], and by Forge, [5].
Both papers present models in which an informed player needs to signal her (private) knowledge about
states of nature to an uninformed second player, whose actions then influence both players’ payoff. The
informed player’s signal to the uninformed player, however, does not directly influence the two players’
payoff. In other words, the signal containing information about the state of nature is costless.
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The first paper that proposed a model which takes into consideration that sending information can be
costly in many circumstances (see, e.g., [13] in the case of organizations) was presented by Gossner,
Herna´ndez and Neyman in [6]. Here, the better informed player - called forecaster - can transmit her
knowledge about the states of nature to the less informed player - called the agent - through her actions,
which also affect the payoff of the players. Hence, sending information in this model is costly in the
sense that the forecaster has to weigh up the pros and cons of the information transmission with respect
to her payoff.
The research we present in this work is directly motivated by [6] and considers a particular alteration of
the payoff function in the respective model. In order to formulate our research questions, let us briefly
introduce the central features of the model in [6]. A repeated game between a team, consisting of a
forecaster and an agent, and nature takes place. The sequence of the states of nature is assumed to be
i.i.d. In each stage of the game, the team members are able to observe the past actions played and the
past states of nature. In addition, unlike the agent, the forecaster is able to observe all future states
of nature. The team receives a payoff in every stage, which depends on the current state of nature, as
well as on the actions of the forecaster and the agent, which we call action triple in the following. The
strategies of the team players induce an infinite sequence of random action triples and hence a limiting
average distribution, Q, of an action triple. A distribution that is induced in such a way is also called an
implementable distribution. The authors in [6] prove two important theorems that characterise the set
of implementable distributions. This characterization involves an information theoretic inequality that
applies the Shannon entropy function (see [15]), which is called the information constraint. This con-
straint can be interpreted as the fact that the amount of information used by the agent cannot be greater
than the information she actually receives from the forecaster. The first result in [6] states that every
implementable distribution fulfills the information constraint. For the second result the authors show
that for every distribution Q that fulfills the information constraint, there exist strategies of the forecaster
and of the agent that implement Q.
Inspired by these two results, we set out to investigate the following. Assume that the payoff of the team
in one stage not only depends on the current actions of the players and on the state of nature, but also
on the actions and states of nature of the preceding stage. That is, we consider two consecutive stages
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whose actions and states of nature influence the payoff. Note that depending on the precise payoff struc-
ture, we are interested in finding implementable distributions which depend on those actions and states
of nature that influence the payoff of the team. The question that naturally arises can be formulated as
follows: Can we develop similar (adapted) information constraints as in [6] to characterise the set of
implementable distributions?
The reader should note that we only focus on the search for which distributions are implementable.
This analysis is independent of the payoff maximization problem (which searches for the optimal im-
plementable distribution w.r.t. maximizing the payoff). However, the results we present in this thesis
present an optimal basis for research problems like these.
We present two different models that take this model setting with an altered payoff structure into ac-
count and analyze the implementable distributions. The following provides a short overview of these
two models. Let us start with the second model. It is closer in structure to [6] than the first model we
present in the sense that only the payoff function changes. In particular, we assume that the team payoff
in one stage depends on the current state of nature and on the current action of the agent, as well as
on the agent’s action in the previous stage. Hence, the actions of the forecaster in this model do not
influence the payoff (they are hence costless).
The first model we present not only differs from [6] in regards of the payoff function, but also regarding
the assumption on the dynamics of the states of nature. More precisely, in this model we let nature react
to past action triples, so that the sequence of the states of nature is not i.i.d. This assumption allows us
to consider a stage payoff function that depends on the complete action triple of the current, as well as
on the previous stage. The first model is therefore more complex and richer in details, and hence takes
up the central part of this thesis.
For both models we are able to formulate an information constraint with a similar interpretation as in
[6], that characterises the respective implementable distribution as follows. We present two main re-
sults for both models. In the first main result we show that every implementable distribution satisfies
the information constraint. The second main result states that every distribution with certain properties
that satisfies the information constraint can be implemented. Note, that the second main results are a
little bit more restrictive than the second main result in [6], since we can only consider a certain set of
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distributions that are implementable if they satisfy the information constraint.
In order to prove the first main theorem for both models, we can apply a useful lemma on the concavity
of the entropy function which is stated in [6]. The proof of the first main theorem for the first model
requires an additional result we present on the entropy of an induced random sequence of action triples.
We can prove this lemma with probabilistic tools such as the Hoeffding inequality.
In order to prove the second main theorems we need to construct strategies of the players that implement
a given distribution. These constructions constitute most of the work of this thesis and hence consist of
the majority of our contributions. Let us first briefly summarise the main ideas of the strategy construc-
tion for the first model. We provide a new conceptualization of a certain typical sequence which we term
Locally Typical Sequence, and introduce the so-called Splicing Algorithm. With the help of these new
concepts and their useful properties we develop, we establish the following mechanism. Let P denote
the distribution we would like to implement. The strategies we construct first induce a set of locally
typical sequences which in turn serves as an input set for the Splicing Algorithm. Then, this algorithm
outputs a sequence of action triples that implements our desired probability distribution, P.
Let us now turn to the construction of the strategies of the second model. Even though this construc-
tion is less complex than the previous one, it applies the methods of [6] in an elegant way, using a new
concept we develop, called Block Distributions. The idea is as follows. We first construct a markov
chain with a transition matrix derived from the distribution we intend to implement, P. Next, we define
a block distribution, Q, of a sequence of random variables drawn from the markov chain. We show that
if Q satisfies the information constraint given in [6], then P is implementable.
The results and the new techniques we present provide novel and thorough insights into the complexity
of strategic information transmission when the players are faced with a markovian payoff function. Note
that that our results not only generalise the setting in [6], but also add a planning problem to the model:
If present action choices also affect future rewards or payoffs, we have a non-trivial planning problem.
Such planning problems appear, for instance, in dynamic pricing models (see, e.g., the seminal work
by Rao and Bass, [14]). These models study, among others, the question of how setting a price today
influences future sales or competitors’ prices. Considering a markovian payoff function and thus adding
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a planning problem to the model of [6] hence increases the scope of its application. Furthermore, the
results we provide can offer an ideal starting point for future research directions that directly build upon
our results. In particular, it provides the basis for the analysis of the optimal payoff of the team, or for
the characterization of the set of equilibrium payoffs.
Most of the tools we employ in this work are information theoretic techniques. In particular, we apply
the Shannon entropy function and its properties, as well as the concept of typical sequences. These
techniques are reviewed in the preliminaries. The remaining sections of the thesis are divided into two
parts. The first part is dedicated to the first model. Chapter 1 in part I describes the model, defines the
implementable distributions and introduces the two main theorems. In chapter 2 of part I, we prove the
first main theorem. As indicated, this proof requires an additional lemma to estimate the entropy of an
induced sequence of random action triples. Chapter 3 of part I contains the preparation and the proof of
the second main theorem. It is the most elaborate chapter of the thesis. We begin with the introduction
of the Splicing Algorithm and provide examples to demonstrate the functioning of this algorithm. We
then continue with the definition of locally typical sequences and explain why this concept is needed for
the construction of the strategies. In the remaining sections of chapter 3 we derive the strategies with
the help of the concepts introduced earlier. We provide one section that explains the functioning of the
strategies in an intuitive way, followed by a section that looks at the details of the strategy construction.
In the last section we prove the second main theorem of the first model. The second part of the thesis is
dedicated to the second model and consists of two chapters. Chapter 1 of part II introduces the model
and defines the implementable distributions. In chapter 2 we prove the two main theorems. The proof
of the second main theorem also requires some preparation, in particular the construction of a markov
chain and the introduction of block distributions, which are also included in chapter 2.
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Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this section we present the key techniques and methods we will employ in part I and in part II.
Notation 1. Given a finite set A, we denote by ∆(A) the set of categorical distributions over A. That
is, every p ∈ ∆(A) is a discrete probability distribution that describes the probability of observing one
possible outcome in A. Throughout this paper, we will be dealing with discrete random variables, which
are denoted by bold or capital letters. We write x∼ p to denote that the probability mass function (pmf)
of the random variable x is p. 
2.1 Entropy
From a very intuitive point of view, entropy is a measure of chaos, where chaos is considered to be a
state of some system. Whenever the elements in the system are spread equally (think of the distance of
particles in a container), the entropy of that system is maximal. Lower entropy occurs, if the elements
are ordered in certain ways (e.g., by equal properties or parameter values). If we consider the entropy
of a random variable, we often interpret it as a measure of uncertainty, or information - which is not so
different from our intuitive notion. For instance, if we wanted to guess the outcome of a random experi-
ment, then our uncertainty about this outcome is the average amount of information, or entropy, that we
don’t have, in order to be certain of the outcome. Now, whenever the outcomes of a random experiment
have equal probability, it is of course much harder to guess the outcome. This is the case of maximal
entropy. The more unequal the probabilities of the outcomes are, the lower the entropy becomes and the
easier for us to guess the outcome. The concept of entropy as a measure of information was first prop-
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erly defined by Claude Shannon in his groundbreaking work, “A Mathematical Theory of Information”,
see [15], as the Shannon entropy function. It will play an important role in this work, especially for
the formalization of the information constraints. Below, we review the most important definitions w.r.t.
entropy and its elementary properties. A good introduction to the Shannon entropy function is given, for
instance, in [2] or [9].
Definition (Entropy of Discrete Random Variables). The entropy of a discrete random variable x with
x∼ p is given by
H(x) =−∑
x
p(x) log(p(x)).
Equally, the entropy of two discrete random variables x,y with (x,y)∼ q is given by
H(x,y) =−∑
x,y
q(x,y) log(q(x,y)),
and is called joint entropy. 
Definition (Conditional Entropy). The conditional entropy of y given x, with (x,y)∼ q, is given by
H(y|x) =∑
x
q(x)H(y|x = x)
=−∑
x
q(x)∑
y
q(y|x) log(q(y|x))
=−∑
x,y
q(x,y) logq(y|x).
The conditional entropy can be thought of as the average uncertainty of y when we observe x. 
Elementary Properties of Entropy
The above defined quantities have the following properties:
• Non-negativity: The entropy of a random variable is always non-negative; H(x)≥ 0, and we have
H(x) = 0 only, iff x is deterministic.
• Monotonicity: Conditioning reduces entropy; H(y|x)≤ H(y).
• Maximum Entropy: If x takes values in a finite set A, then H(x) ≤ log2 |A|. The maximum
entropy is reached, if and only if x is uniformly distributed.
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• Non-increasing under functions: For every (deterministic) function f (x) of x, it holds that
H( f (x))≤ H(x).
• Chain Rule: Given a sequence of n random variables (x1,x2, . . .xn), the chain rule tells us that we
can decompose the joint entropy of the n random variables as follows:
H(x1,x2, . . .xn) =
n
∑
i=1
H(xi|xi−1, . . .x1).
For two variables, (x,y) this becomes
H(x,y) = H(x|y)+H(y) = H(y|x)+H(x).
Notation 2. Occasionally, we write Hp(x) (Hq(y|x)), if we need to highlight that x ∼ p ((x,y) ∼ q).
Moreover, instead of Hp(x), we sometimes also write H(p), if the context demands it. 
Relative Entropy
Related to the concept of entropy is the relative entropy, also known as Kullback-Leibler distance. It is
a measure of how much one probability distribution differs from another, where a lower relative entropy
points to similar behavior.
Definition. Let P and Q denote two distributions in ∆(A). The Kullback-Leibler distance between P
and Q (or short: KL-distance), is defined as follows:
D(P||Q) = ∑
a∈A
P(a) log
P(a)
Q(a)
.

The KL-distance has the following basic properties:
• Non-Negativity: D(P||Q)≥ 0 and D(P||Q) = 0 iff P = Q.
• Convexity: D(P||Q) is convex in (P,Q).
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2.2 Types and Typical Sequences
Let us first give a small overview of how typical sequences have grown in importance in Information
Theory. It was again Claude Shannon, who introduced typical sequences (in a more intuitive than tech-
nical sense) as a powerful tool to establish his Information Theory. One of his key discoveries (in a
simplified version) was the following. Consider a distribution, p, over a finite alphabet A. Shannon
connected typical sequences with the entropy of p, by observing that the negative logarithm of the prob-
ability of a typical sequence of length n, that is drawn i.i.d. from p, divided by n is close to H(p).
Furthermore, for n large enough, the (total) probability of all non-typical sequences is arbitrarily small.
Consequently, Shannon concluded, for large n, typical sequences happen frequently, even though there
are few of them in An (approximately 2nH(X)). These key discoveries are known today as the AEP, the
Asymptotic Equipartition Theorem, and form the basis for Shannon’s famous Coding Theorems (which
won’t be discussed here).
So far, we described important properties of typical sequences, without providing a proper definition.
Typical sequences have been defined in various forms, from weakly typical sequences, to (ε-) strongly
typical sequences. In the following, we first follow the method of types, first introduced in [4], to define
typical sequences, and the results below are taken from [2], if not otherwise stated.
2.2.1 First Order Types
Definition (First Order Type). Let A be a finite set. For a given integer n ∈ N, let xn be a sequence in
An. For every a ∈ A, denote by N(a|xn) the number of occurrences of element a in xn. The first order
type of xn is given by the empirical distribution of xn, defined by
emp(xn)[a] = 1n N(a|xn) for all a ∈ A. (2.1)

Remark. The set of all types with denominator n is denoted byPn, for which we have an upper bound:
|Pn| ≤ (n+1)|A|. (2.2)
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Definition (First Order Type Set). Let P ∈Pn. The set of all sequences xn ∈ An with first order type P
is given by
Tn(P) = {x ∈ An : emp(x) = P} , (2.3)
and we call every sequence in Tn(P) typical w.r.t. P. 
Remark (The Size of a First Order Type Set). The lower and upper bounds of the size of Tn(P) are well
known:
1
(n+1)|A|
2nH(P) ≤ |Tn(P)| ≤ 2nH(P). (2.4)
(See Theorem 11.1.3 on page 350 in [2].) 
2.2.2 Second Order Types
Second order types are related to the relative frequency of pairs in a sequence xn ∈ An. Before we begin,
we present some notation.
Notation 3. Let P2 denote a distribution over a finite set A×A = A2. If P2 has full support, then for
every pair (a,b) ∈ A2, P2(b|a) denotes the conditional probability of b given a. 
Definition (Second Order Type). Consider a sequence xn ∈ An. For every pair (a,b) ∈ A2, N(a,b|xn)
denotes the number of occurrences of the pair (a,b) in xn. The empirical distribution over pairs in xn,
denoted by emp2(xn), is given by the relative frequency of pairs in xn:
emp2(xn)[a,b] = 1n−1 N(a,b|xn) for all (a,b) ∈ A2, (2.5)
and we call emp2(xn) the second order type of xn. 
Definition (Second Order Type Set). Let P2 ∈ ∆(A2). The set of all sequences xn ∈ An with second order
type P2 is called the second order type set and we write
T 2n (P2) = {x ∈ An : emp2(xn) = P2} . (2.6)
If T 2n (P2) 6= /0, then a sequence xn ∈ T 2n (P2) is called 2-typical w.r.t. P2. 
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In the following remark we look at the marginal distribution of a second order type:
Remark 1. Let xn ∈ T 2n (P2) 6= /0 and denote by x(1) = (x1, . . . ,xn−1) the sequence of the first n− 1
elements of xn and by x(2) = (x2, . . . ,xn) the sequence of the last n−1 elements of xn. Let P(1) and P(2)
denote the first order type of x(1) and x(2) respectively. Obviously, P(1) and P(2) only differ if x1 6= xn.
Moreover, observe that
∑
a∈A
P2(a,b) = ∑
a∈A
emp(xn)[a,b]
= 1n−1 ∑
a∈A
N(a,b|xn)
= 1n−1 N(b|x(2))
= emp(x(2))[b]
= P(2)(b),
and similarly, ∑b∈A P2(a,b) = P(1)(a). For n→ ∞, we set P(1) → P and P(2) → P, and we call P the
(asymptotically) unique marginal distribution of P2 on A. 
We now develop a new set of sequences that we term conditional subsequences. These sequences will
exclusively be of use in part 1, however, due to their relation to second types, we introduce them here.
Definition 1 (Conditional Subsequences). Let xn ∈ An and let x(1) and x(2) be given as in Remark 1. For
every a ∈ A, define the following subsequence of xn:
xna = (x
n
a,1,x
n
a,2, . . . ,x
n
a,N(a|xn
(1))
),
where for every i∈ (1, . . . ,N(a|xn(1))), xna,i is the element in xn that succeeds the ith occurrence of element
a in xn. We call xna the conditional subsequence of x
n w.r.t a. 
The following example demonstrates the intuitive concept behind a conditional subsequence:
Example 1. Let A = {0,1} and let xn = (0,1,1,0,0,1,1,1). Then,
xn0 = (1,0,1)
xn1 = (1,0,1,1)
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The following definition establishes the link between conditional subsequences and second order types.
Definition 2 (Typical Conditional Subsequences). Let P2 be a second order type with T 2n (P2) 6= /0 and
with full support. For every xn ∈ T 2n (P2) there are |A| conditional subsequences of xn, {xna : a ∈ A}, which
we call typical conditional subsequences. 
Let us now deduce important properties of typical conditional subsequences:
Remark 2. We continue with the notation of Definition 2. If n is large, then by Remark 1, P2 has
an (asymptotically) unique marginal distribution P ∈ ∆(A). Then, for every xn ∈ T 2n (P2), every typical
conditional subsequence of xn has length (n−1)P(a) and has first order type P2(·|a). This can be easily
seen as follows. We know from Remark 1 that for every a ∈ A, 1(n−1)N(a|x(1)) = P(a). Therefore, the
length of every typical conditional subsequence xna of x
n is given by N(a|x(1)) = (n−1)P(a) (recall the
notation of x(1) and x(2) as introduced in Remark 1 - the choice of x(1) and not x(2) is important here).
Furthermore, the first order type of a typical conditional subsequence is derived below,
emp(xna)[b] =
1
(n−1)P(a)N(b|xna)
= 1(n−1)P(a)N(a,b|xn)
= 1(n−1)P(a)(n−1)P2(a,b)
= P2(b|a).

2.2.3 ε-Typical Sequences
In this section we present the concept of ε-typical sequences and sets. In the literature, this is also
sometimes termed as Strongly Typical Sequences and Sets. ε-typical sequences prove to be a useful
alternative to typical sequences if we can live with the fact that a first order type of a (sufficiently long)
sequence is not exactly equal to a true distribution, but only close to it. Similar to typical conditional
subsequence, ε-typical sequences will solely occur in part 1, but appear here due to the connection to
typical sequences. In the following sections we adopt the notation from Chapter 14 in [16].
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In the following, denote by P ∈ ∆(A) the true distribution over the elements of a finite set A and let
X1,X2, . . . denote a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with Xi ∼ P, ∀i≥ 1.
Definition (The ε-typical set T εn (P)). Let ε > 0. The ε-typical set w.r.t. a distribution P∈ ∆(A), denoted
by T εn (P), is given by the set of sequences whose first order type is ε-close to P in the following sense:
T εn (P) =
xn : ∀a ∈ A,

∣∣1
n N(a|xn)−P(a)
∣∣< ε, if P(a)> 0
1
n N(a|xn) = 0, else.
 (2.7)

ε-typical sequences and sets have many useful properties, the one of interest to us is stated below.
Remark (The Probability of an ε-Typical Sequence Occurring). Let Xn = (X1, . . .Xn) denote an i.i.d.
sequence with law P and let Pn denote the product distribution over An derived from P. Furthermore, let
c =−∑a∈A logP(a). Denote by xn ∈ In a realization of Xn. If xn ∈ T εn (P(a)), then
2−n(H(X)+cε) ≤ Pn(xn)≤ 2−n(H(X)−cε). (2.8)
(See Property 14.7.4 on page 424 in [16].) 
The concept of ε-typical sequences can be extended to conditional ε-typical sequences:
Definition (The Conditional ε-Typical Set). Let A and B be two finite sets and denote by PA×B a distri-
bution over elements in A×B with marginal PA on A and PB on B. Let xn ∈ Xn be an ε-typical sequence
in T εn (PA). The conditional ε-typical set w.r.t. xn and PA×B, denoted by T εn (PA×B|xn), consists of all those
sequences yn ∈ Bn such that for every pair (a,b) ∈ A×B, N(a,b|xn,yn) (the number of occurrences of
the pair (a,b) ∈ X ×Y in the sequence of pairs (xn,yn) = ((x1,y1),(x2,y2), . . . ,(xn,yn)) ∈ (A×B)n) is
close to the product of 1n N(a|xn) with the true conditional distribution PA×B(b|a) as follows:
T εn (PA×B|xn) ={yn ∈ Bn : ∀(a,b) ∈ A×B,
|N(a,b|xn,yn)−PA×B(b|a)N(a|xn)|< nε, if PA×B(b|a)> 0
N(a,b|xn,yn) = 0,else.

(2.9)

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Similar to the probability of an ε-typical sequence occurring, there exists an equivalent on the probability
of a conditional ε-typical sequence occurring:
Remark (The Probability of a Conditional ε-Typical Sequence Occurring). We follow the notation in
the definition of a conditional ε-typical set. Let xn ∈ T εn (PA) and let Y n = (Y1, . . . ,Yn) denote a sequence
of n independent random variables in Bn distributed according to {PA×B(·|a) : a ∈ A} and xn, i.e., Pr(Yj =
b) = PA×B(b|x j), for every j ∈ (1, . . . ,n). Denote by yn a realization of Y n. If yn ∈ T εn (PA×B|xn), then
2−n(H(b|a)+2c
′ε) ≤ Pn(yn|xn)≤ 2−n(H(b|a)−2c′ε), (2.10)
where Pn(yn|xn) = ∏nj=1 PA×B(y j|x j) and c′ = ∑(a,b)∈A×B(logPA×B(b|a)− PA×B(b|a) log(PA×B(b|a))).

2.2.4 The Random Empirical Distribution
Finally, let us consider the concept of a random empirical distribution.
Definition. Let Xn be a sequence of random variables Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn) (not necessarily i.i.d), that
takes values in An. Let Pn ∈ ∆(An) denote the pmf of Xn. Denote by Pi the marginal distribution of Pn
on coordinate i, i.e., Pi(a) = ∑xn∈An,xi=a P
n(xn). Furthermore, consider the indicator random variables
1{X1=a},1{X2=a}, . . . ,1{Xn=a}. The random empirical distribution of X
n at a ∈ A is the sample mean of
these indicator random variables,
1
n
n
∑
i=1
1{Xi=a} = emp(X)[a] =
1
n N(a|Xn). (2.11)

Remark. Note, that E[1{Xi=a}] = Pi(a), hence the expected empirical distribution is the average of the
marginal distributions of Pn:
E[emp(X)] = 1n
n
∑
i=1
Pi. (2.12)
Furthermore, if Xn is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with law µ , then the above equality simplifies
to
E[emp(X)] = µ. (2.13)

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Part I
Model 1
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Chapter 1
Properties of the Model and Main Results
1.1 Features of Model 1
Let us now introduce the features of the first model. Many assumptions we make below are similar to
the model in [6], the major differences are our assumptions on the payoff function and on nature’s play.
We begin with the action sets.
Denote by I, J and K the action sets of nature, forecaster and agent respectively. Again, the forecaster
and the agent form a team. We analyze a repeated game between the team and nature. In each stage
t ≥ 0, denote by xt , yt and zt the actions played by nature, forecaster and agent, respectively. We call
at = (xt ,yt ,zt) an action triple and assume that a0 is chosen arbitrarily.
In each stage t > 0, the team is assigned a stage payoff, described by gt . This function not only depends
on an action triple played in stage t, but also on the action triple played in the previous stage, i.e.,
gt : (I× J×K)2→ R.
In a repeated game, we allow nature to react to action triples as follows. Let µ ∈ ∆(I). Prior to the
start of the game, for every a ∈ I× J×K, nature draws independent µ-distributed and I-valued random
variables ua1,u
a
2,u
a
3, . . .= (u
a
t )t≥1. For every a ∈ A, we refer to (uat )t≥1 as nature’s conditional sequence
w.r.t. a. Furthermore, denote by U the random matrix with rows {(uat )t≥1 : a ∈ A}, and we write Ur to
denote a realization of U . We interpret a matrix element ual in Ur to be nature’s choice of action in the
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repeated game after the lth occurrence of action triple a in the past play. More precisely: at stage t = 0,
we let nature choose an action arbitrarily. In every following stage t ≥ 1 in the repeated game, nature
first observes the previous action triple at−1, and then counts its number of occurrences, l, in the entire
past play. In stage t, nature plays xt = u
at−1
l .
We assume that the forecaster observes a realization, Ur, of U before the game starts and that she is fully
informed about the entire history of the play in every stage of the repeated game. Her (pure) strategy at
stage t, denoted by σt , therefore depends on Ur and on the history of action triples
σt : (Ur× It−1× Jt−1×Kt−1)→ J,
and her strategy for the repeated game, σ , is given by the sequence (σt) = σ . The agent has no further
knowledge other than the history of action triples in the repeated game. Therefore, her strategy at stage
t is given by a function
τt : (It−1× Jt−1×Kt−1)→ K,
and her strategy of the entire game, τ , is given by the sequence (τt) = τ .
The random matrix U together with the strategies (σ ,τ) induce a random sequence of action triples
a1,a2, . . .. We denote the corresponding probability distribution over (I× J×K)N by PU,σ ,τ .
Notation 4. Denote by PtU,σ ,τ the marginal distribution of PU,σ ,τ over stage t’s action triple, at , and
denote by Pt;2U,σ ,τ the marginal distribution over 2 consecutive action triples, (at ,at+1). Let Q
t
U,σ ,τ =
1
t ∑
t
t ′=1 P
t ′
U,σ ,τ be the average distribution up to stage t, and let Q
t;2
U,σ ,τ =
1
t−1 ∑
t
t ′=1 P
t ′;2
U,σ ,τ be the average
distribution over 2 consecutive action triples up to stage t (we also refer to the latter as the expected
2-step empirical distribution). 
Definition 3 (Implementable Distribution). Similar to [6], we call a distribution Q ∈ ∆((I× J×K)2)
implementable (t-implementable), if there is a strategy pair, (σ ,τ), that implements (t-implements) the
distribution Q, i.e., if Qt;2U,σ ,τ → Q as t → ∞ (Qt;2U,σ ,τ = Q). We denote by Q (respectively, Q(t)) the set
of implementable (respectively, t-implementable) distributions. 
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Remark 3. It should be pointed out that an implementable distribution Q is the limit of an expected 2-
step empirical distribution, Qt;2U,σ ,τ . In other words, if an expected 2-step empirical distribution, Q
t;2
U,σ ,τ ,
converges to Q, then we call Q implementable. 
One important property of the setsQ andQ(t) which is used in the proof of Theorem 2 is stated below.
Remark 4. Every distribution Q ∈Q(t) is implementable, i.e.,Q(t) is contained inQ. 
(The proof of this remark is provided in the Appendix.)
1.2 Main Results
Our aim in this part is two-fold. On the one hand, we would like to describe the set of implementable
distributions, Q, in terms of an information constraint. On the other hand, we would like to specify
distributions that are implementable - if possible - with the same information constraint. The results
we produce in this paper achieve this goal - albeit under some restrictive assumptions. The information
constraint we developed is given as follows.
Notation 5. Let i, i′ be I-, j, j′ be J- and k, k′ be K- valued random variables respectively. We write
(i′, j′,k′, i, j,k)∼ P2 ∈ ∆((I×J×K)2) to denote that the first random triple (i′, j′,k′) precedes the second
random triple, (i, j,k). 
Information Constraint
A distribution P2 ∈ ∆((I× J×K)2) is said to fulfill the information constraint if
HP2(i,j|k, i′, j′,k′)≥ HP2(i|i′, j′,k′). (1.1)
Equivalently, the information constraint can be stated as follows:
HP2(j|k, i′, j′,k′)≥ HP2(i|i′, j′,k′)−HP2(i|k, i′, j′,k′).
In this form one can interpret the information constraint as the fact that the information used by the agent
(right-hand side) cannot be greater than the information she receives from the forecaster (left-hand side),
which is similar to the interpretation of the information constraint in [6].
24
In the first result we are able to show that every implementable distribution Q ∈ ∆((I×J×K)2) satisfies
the information constraint. In the second result we describe distributions, such that if they satisfy the
information constraint, they are indeed implementable.
Lemma 1. Every t- implementable distribution P2 ∈ ∆((I× J×K)2) fulfills the information constraint
asymptotically, i,e., HP2(i,j|k, i′, j′,k′)≥ HP2(i|i′, j′,k′)−δ (t), where δ (t)→ 0 as t→ ∞.
Theorem 1. Every implementable distribution P2 ∈ ∆((I× J×K)2) fulfills the information constraint.
Theorem 2. Let P2 be a distribution over (I× J×K)2 with the following properties:
• The marginal distribution of P2 on the first and the second coordinates is identical, i.e., with
(i, i′, j, j′,k,k′)∼ P2, then (i′, j′,k′)∼ (i, j,k)∼ P.
• i is independent of (i′, j′,k′), i.e., i∼ i|(i′, j′,k′)∼ µ .
• P2 fulfills the information constraint.
Then, P2 is implementable.
Remark 5. The second property in Theorem 2 is a technical requirement in the proof of this Theorem,
as we will see later on. Note that assuming i to be independent of (i′, j′,k′) does not entirely reflect
our assumption on nature’s play in the game. As outlined in the model, the occurrance of an action
triple (i′, j′,k′) in one stage, t, of the game may affect the probability of nature’s action, i, in the next
stage, t +1. This possible dependence can hence not be depicted in the implementable distributions of
Theorem 2. 
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Chapter 2
Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1 follows directly from Lemma 1. The proof of Lemma 1 requires two additional Lemmas. In
the first one, we show that the limiting average entropy of a random sequence of action triples is close
to the entropy H(µ). The second result we need is the Concavity Lemma which is stated as Lemma 1 in
[6]. Both lemmas are stated below.
Lemma 2. Let a= (a1,a2, . . .an) be a random sequence of action triples taking values in An = (I×J×
K)n, induced by strategies (σ ,τ) and the random matrix U. Then,
1
n H(a)≥ H(µ)−δ (n),
where δ (n)→ 0 as n→ ∞
Lemma (Concavity-Lemma). Let X and Y be finite sets. The function Q 7→ HQ(y|x) is concave on the
set of probability measures on X×Y .
The result in Lemma 1 can now be derived as follows:
Proof of Lemma 1. Let a = (a1,a2, . . .an) = (i1, j1,k1, . . . , in, jn,kn) be a random sequence of action
triples induced by strategies (σ ,τ) and the random matrix U with a∼ PU,σ ,τ .
Let Qn;2U,σ ,τ =
1
n ∑
n
t=1 P
t;2
U,σ ,τ denote the respective expected 2-step empirical distribution, as introduced in
Notation 4. Applying the Concavity Lemma from GHN, we get
HQn;2U,σ ,τ (i, j|k, i
′, j′,k′)≥ 1n
n
∑
t=1
HPt;2U,σ ,τ (i, j|k, i
′, j′,k′).
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Furthermore, we have
1
n
n
∑
t=1
H(it , jt |kt , it−1, jt−1,kt−1) =
1
n
n
∑
t=1
H(it , jt ,kt |kt , it−1, jt−1,kt−1)
≥ 1
n
n
∑
t=1
H(it , jt ,kt |kt , it−1, jt−1,kt−1, . . . , i1, j1,k1) (2.1)
≥ 1
n
n
∑
t=1
H(it , jt ,kt |it−1, jt−1,kt−1, . . . , i1, j1,k1) (2.2)
=
1
n
H(i1, j1,k1, . . . , in, jn,kn) (2.3)
=
1
n
H(a),
where inequality (2.1) follows since conditioning reduces entropy, inequality (2.2) is due to the fact that
kt is a function of (i1, j1,k1, . . . , it−1, jt−1,kt−1) and equality (2.3) is an application of the chain rule.
Together with Lemma 2, we can conclude
H(µ)−δ (n)≤ 1
n
H(a)≤ 1
n
n
∑
t=1
HPt;2U,σ ,τ (i, j|k, i
′, j′,k′),
and therefore
HQn:2Uσ ,τ (i, j|i
′, j′,k,k′)≥ H(µ)−δ (n).
Let us now go back to Lemma 2. Before we look at the proof, we need to mention two important concepts
that we are going to employ. The first one is Hoeffding’s inequality, which provides a probability bound
for the distance of a random variable to its expected value. From [7], we cite the following Theorem and
Corollary:
Theorem. (Hoeffding) Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be i.i.d. random variables with 0≤ Xi ≤ 1 (i = 1, . . . ,n). Fur-
thermore, let X¯ = 1n ∑
n
i=1 Xi and µ = EX¯ . Then, for every t > 0:
Pr(X¯−µ ≥ t)≤ exp(−2nt2).
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Corollary. Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xn be i.i.d. random variables as in Theorem (2). Then, for every t ≥ 0:
Pr(|X¯−µ| ≥ t)≤ 2exp(−2nt2). (2.4)
Second, we introduce the concept of a region:
Definition 4. [Region of U] Let A = I× J×K and let b ∈Pn(A) denote a first order type with denom-
inator n. By definition, for every a ∈ A, nb(a) ∈ N. A region in the random matrix U specified by b,
defines, for every a ∈ A, the segment of the first nb(a) elements of the row sequence (uak)k in U . We
write xnb = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) to denote the joined sequence of nature’s actions in a region. The order of the
elements in xnb follows the order of the rows in U , i.e., we first add the elements of of the first row of the
specified region in U to xnb, then the elements of the second row, and so on. By construction, the length
of xnb is n. 
Remark 6. Since a region is solely specified by a type inPn(A), the sequence of nature in such a region
is i.i.d. with law µ . 
We now have all the tools at hand to prove Lemma 2:
Proof of Lemma 2. Let a¯ denote the (random) empirical distribution of a. Further, let ua be the ran-
dom sequence of nature’s actions in a. Note that ua is a function of a, hence we have H(a) ≥ H(ua).
Therefore, it is sufficient to prove
1
n H(ua)≥ H(µ)−δ (n).
Let ua ∼ ρn ∈ ∆(In). Recall, that Pn(A) denotes the set of empirical distributions over A. Let ub be
the (random) action sequence of nature given a¯ = b with b ∈Pn(A) and we set ub ∼ ρnb . Further, let
µn = µ×µ×·· ·µ denote the product measure on In.
We will make use of the following operator, introduced in [12]. For a distribution q that is absolutely
continuous1 w.r.t a distribution p define the following linear operator:
Lp(q) := H(q)+D(q||p) =−∑
i
log(pi)qi.
1q is absolutely continuous w.r.t p if p(x) = 0→ q(x) = 0 for all x.
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Now,
H(ua)≥ H(ua|a¯)
= ∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯ = b)H(ua|a¯ = b)
= ∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯ = b)H(ub)
= ∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯ = b)H(ρnb )
= ∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯ = b)(Lµn(ρnb )−D(ρnb ||µn))
= ∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯ = b)Lµn(ρnb )− ∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯ = b)D(ρnb ||µn)) (2.5)
The remaining proof is split into two claims that focus on the sums in equation (2.5):
Claim 1. For all δ > 0 there is Nδ s.t. for all n≥ Nδ :
∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯= b)Lµn(ρnb )≥ n(H(µ)−δ ).
Claim 2.
∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯= b)D(ρnb ||µn))≤ O(log(n))
We prove Claim 1 as follows: Since Lµn(ρnb ) is a linear operator in ρ
n
b , we get:
∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯ = b)Lµn(ρnb ) = Lµn
(
∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯ = b)ρnb
)
= Lµn(ρn).
Now, we show
Lµn(ρn)≥
n
∑
j=1
Lµ(ρ j), (2.6)
where ρ j denotes the marginal distribution of ρn on coordinate j, i.e., for a ∈ I
ρ j(a) = ∑
xn∈In
x j=a
ρn(x).
Recall, that for xn ∈ In we have µn(xn) =∏nj=1 µ(x j), hence
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Lµn(ρn) =− ∑
xn∈In
log(µn(xn))ρn(xn)
=− ∑
xn∈In
n
∑
j=1
log(µ(x j))ρn(xn)
=−
n
∑
j=1
∑
xn∈In
log(µ(x j))ρn(xn)
=−
n
∑
j=1
∑
a∈I
∑
xn∈In
x j=a
log(µ(x j))ρn(xn)
=−
n
∑
j=1
∑
a∈I
∑
xn∈In
x j=a
log(µ(a))ρn(xn)
=−
n
∑
j=1
∑
a∈I
log(µ(a)) ∑
xn∈In
x j=a
ρn(xn)
=−
n
∑
j=1
∑
a∈I
log(µ(a))ρ j(a)
=
n
∑
j=1
Lµ(ρ j), (2.7)
which proves (2.6). Now, recall that Lµ(ρ j) is linear in ρ j, therefore, we can simplify the expression in
(2.7) to
n
∑
j=1
Lµ(ρ j) = n
(
1
n
n
∑
j=1
Lµ(ρ j)
)
= n
(
Lµ
(
1
n
n
∑
j=1
ρ j
))
,
where 1n ∑
n
j=1ρ j is the expected empirical distribution of nature’s actions ua. Note, that if u¯a denotes the
(random) empirical distribution of ua, we have 1n ∑
n
j=1ρ j = E[u¯a] (recall, that u¯a takes values inPn(I)).
The result in (2.6) is therefore equivalent to
Lµn(ρn)≥ nLµ(E[u¯a]). (2.8)
Now, we show
‖E[u¯a]−µ‖→ 0 as n→ ∞. (2.9)
First, recall that by Definition 4 and by Remark 6 every fixed type b ∈Pn(A) corresponds to a region
in the random matrix U , in which the sequence of nature, xnb = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) is i.i.d. with law µ . Let
x¯nb denote the (random) empirical distribution of x
n
b which takes values in Pn(I). Now, let ε > 0 and
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fix b ∈Pn(A). Denote by Eb,ε the event that the L1-distance between x¯nb and µ is larger than ε , i.e.,∥∥x¯nb−µ∥∥> ε . Hence, the union of these events, ⋃b∈Pn(A)Eb,ε , depicts the event that there exists at least
one type b ∈Pn(A), with
∥∥x¯nb−µ∥∥> ε . Applying the Hoeffding inequality, we get
Pr(Eb,ε) = Pr(|x¯n−µ|> ε)≤ 2exp(−2nε2),
and
Pr(
⋃
b∈Pn(A)
Eb,ε)≤ ∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(Eb,ε)
≤ (n+1)|A|2exp(−2nε2).
Therefore,
Pr(
⋃
b∈Pn(A)
Eb,ε)→ 0, as n→ ∞. (2.10)
Now, by the law of total expectation, letting Eε =
⋃
b∈Pn(A)Eb,ε , and applying (2.10), it holds that
‖E[u¯a]−µ‖= ‖E[u¯a|Eε ]Pr(Eε)+E[u¯a|Ecε ](1−Pr(Eε))− (µPr(Eε)+µ(1−Pr(Eε)))‖
= ‖(E[u¯a|Eε ]−µ)Pr(Eε)+(E[u¯a|Ecε ]−µ)(1−Pr(Eε))‖
≤ Pr(Eε)‖E[u¯a|Eε ]−µ‖+(1−Pr(Eε))‖E[u¯a|Ecε ]−µ‖
≤ ε for n large enough,
since ‖E[u¯a|Ecε ]−µ‖ ≤ ε and ‖E[u¯a|Eε ]−µ‖ is bounded by 2. Hence, since this holds for all ε > 0, the
result in (2.9) follows:
‖E[u¯a]−µ‖→ 0 as n→ ∞.
We can now finalise the proof of Claim 1. Note, that the linear operator Lµ is continuous and therefore
Lipschitz continuous (continuity and Lipschitz continuity are equivalent for linear operators). Hence,
there exists µ∗ > 0 (in fact, µ∗ = mini∈I µi) such that
∣∣Lµ(E[u¯a])−Lµ(µ)∣∣≤ µ∗ ‖E[u¯a]−µ‖→ 0 as n→ ∞.
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Therefore, for all δ > 0 there is Nδ , s.t. for all n > Nδ :
Lµ(E[u¯a])≥ Lµ(µ)−δ .
This completes the proof of Claim 1, since Lµ(µ) = H(µ).
Let us now turn to the proof of Claim 2. Let pb = (Pr(a¯ = b),Pr(a¯ 6= b)) denote a binary distribution.
Further, define ρnbc =
µn−ρnb Pr(a¯=b)
Pr(a¯6=b) s.t.
µn = Pr(a¯ = b)ρnb +Pr(a¯ 6= b)ρnbc .
Applying Proposition 3 in the Appendix, we get
Pr(a¯ = b)D(ρnb ||µn)+Pr(a¯ 6= b)D(ρnbc ||µn)≤ H(pb),
hence,
∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯ = b)D(ρnb ||µn)≤ ∑
b∈Pn(A)
H(pb).
Now, letting k = |Pn(A)| we show
1
k ∑
b∈Pn(A)
H(pb)≤ H(1k ). (2.11)
Since the entropy is a concave function in pb, we have
1
k ∑
b∈Pn(A)
H(Y b)≤ H(1k ∑
b∈Pn(A)
pb).
With p = 1k ∑b∈Pn(A) pb, p is a Bernoulli distribution with support in {0,1} and with
p = 1k ∑
b∈Pn(A)
Pr(a¯ = b) = 1k .
Hence, the inequality in (2.11) follows.
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Finally, we can deduce
∑
b∈Pn(A)
H(Y b)≤ kH(1k )
=−k(1k log(1k )+(1− 1k ) log(1− 1k ))
=−(− log(k)+ log(1− 1k )k−1)
= O(log(n)),
where the last equality follows since log(1− 1k )k−1 is bounded by − 1ln2 as k→ ∞ and k ≤ (n+ 1)|A|.
This concludes the proof of Claim 2.
Claim 1 and Claim 2 now imply the result in Lemma 2.
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Chapter 3
Proof of Theorem 2
The proof of Theorem 2 is more complex than the proof of Theorem 1 and requires substantial prepa-
ration. We begin with the motivation of our proof idea, followed by a general outline of our approach.
These introductions will facilitate the understanding of the subsequent sections.
3.1 Motivation for the Proof of Theorem 2
Some of the key ideas that we are going to apply in the proof of Theorem 2 originate from the proof of
Theorem 2 in [6], which is stated below for completeness.
Theorem (Theorem 2 in [6]). Any distribution Q∈ ∆(I×J×K) that satisfies the information constraint
(HQ(i, j|k)> HQ(i)) and has marginal µ on I is implementable.
We now explain how this result influenced our proof idea. To this end, let us compare our model with
the model in [6]. One major difference between the two models is the assumption on the sequence of
nature’s actions. While in [6] the sequence of nature is assumed to be i.i.d., in our model nature’s ac-
tions played in one stage depend on the actions played of all players in the previous stages. Only the
conditional sequences of nature are assumed to be i.i.d. The general approach in [6] to implement a
distribution Q was to construct strategies that induce a sequence of action triples with a first order type
close to Q. This approach led us to the following idea. Let P′2 ∈ ∆((I× J×K)2) be a distribution with
the same properties as in Theorem 2, and for a ∈ A, let P′2(·|a) denote a conditional distribution of P′2.
With the help of the results in [6], we know how to implement P′2(·|a). I.e., we need to construct strate-
gies that induce a sequence with first order type P′2(·|a). However, we not only want to implement one
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conditional distribution P′2(·|a), the aim is to construct strategies such that for every a ∈ A a sequence
with first order type P′2(·|a) is induced. Then, in a next step, we need to construct a mechanism to join
these sequences together appropriately, so that they yield a sequence with second order type close to P′2.
Note, however, that for some a ∈ A, P′2(·|a) may not be defined, which may cause problems inducing
sequences with such a type. However, by Lemma 16 in the Appendix, we can find a distribution P2 ∈
∆((I× J×K)2) that is close to P′2, satisfies the conditions stated in Theorem 2, and, in addition, has full
support, so that for every a ∈ A the conditional distribution P2(·|a) is well-defined.
3.2 The General Approach
Let us now first outline the basic set up for the proof, before we specify the proof idea outlined above a
little bit more. The aim is to construct strategies for the forecaster and for the agent that together with
nature’s actions induce a certain game with the following properties. Given a specified integer n∈N, we
first divide the stages of the game into blocks of length n. The strategies will be designed in such a way,
that in each block k > 1 and dependent on the actions of nature, they induce action sequences for the
forecaster and for the agent, that will be combined into a sequence of action triples αn ∈ (I× J×K)n.
We will show that in almost every block k > 1, αn has a second order type close to the distribution we
intend to implement.
If P′2 is the distribution we want to implement, let us now choose a distribution P2 that is close to P
′
2 with
the same properties as stated in Theorem 2 and with full support. Following the idea in the previous
section, our approach to prove Theorem 2 is to induce a sequence αn ∈ (I× J×K)n in every block
k > 1, that has a second order type close to P2, via first inducing |A| sequences with first order type
P2(·|a), for every a ∈ A. An important question that arises is concerned with the length of these |A|
sequences, if we have a fixed block length, n. The following observation provides some insights on this
question.
Observation 1. Let A = I× J×K and let P2 ∈ ∆(A2) be a distribution that has full support. Fix n ∈ N,
such that P2 has a non-empty second order type set w.r.t. length n+ 1, i.e., T 2n+1(P2) 6= /0. Let αn+1 ∈
T 2n+1(P2). Then, by Remark 2, for every a ∈ A, the typical conditional subsequence αn+1a of αn+1 has
length nP(a) and has first order type P2(·|a). 
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Remark 7. The strategies we are going to construct in the proof of Theorem 2 actually produce a
sequence αn+1 = (α0,α1, . . . ,αn) of length n+ 1 per block k > 0, with the property that α0 is the last
element played in the previous block. We will assume n to be large in our proof, therefore, the difference
in the second order type of the sequences αn+1 and αn is negligible. 
With the help of Observation 1, we now present the general approach which summarises our first (in-
tuitive) idea of how to induce a sequence αn ∈ (I× J×K)n that has a second order type close to P2.
This approach should be considered as a guideline that will undergo a process of amendments until we
eventually arrive at the actual approach that we take in the proof of Theorem 2.
The General Approach
Step 1: (Sequence Induction) At the beginning of block k > 1, we induce a set of sequences{
αnP(a) ∈ TnP(a)(P2(·|a)) : a ∈ A
}
(note that every sequence in this set has the same properties as
the typical conditional subsequences of a sequence αn+1 ∈ T 2n+1(P2)).
Step 2: (Sequence Splicing) We combine the sequences from Step 1 into a sequence αn, s.t. its second
order type is close to P2.
In the section that follows we will focus on Step 2. We will test whether the splicing can be accom-
plished with the given set of sequences given in Step 1. For this, we provide an algorithm that uses these
sequences as input and combines them into one sequence with the aim of maintaining the correct transi-
tion frequencies stipulated by {P2(·|a) : a ∈ A}. We will then come across several problems concerning
the length and the second order type of the output sequence. These issues will force us to make changes
to the set of (input-) sequences in Step 1, which will be highlighted at the end of the relevant paragraphs.
3.3 Sequence Splicing
3.3.1 The Splicing Algorithm
Definition 5 (Input Set). Fix n∈N and let A be a finite set (|A| ≥ 2). Furthermore, let P2 be a distribution
over A2 with full support, unique marginal distribution P ∈ ∆(A), and non-empty second order type set
T 2n+1(P2) 6= /0. For every a ∈ A, denote the marginal distributions by ρa = P2(·|a). Since P2 has full
support, then by Remark 2 there are |A| first order type sets of the form {TnP(a)(ρa) : a ∈ A}. Denote by
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S a choice of |A| sequences, one from each set TnP(a)(ρa), a ∈ A:
S =
{
αnP(a) ∈ TnP(a)(ρa) : a ∈ A
}
.
We call S an input set for the Splicing Algorithm w.r.t. n and P2. 
Notation 6. In order to ease notation we sometimes abbreviate the sequence αnP(a) ∈ S to αa for every
a ∈ A if the associated distribution P2 is known. 
We now introduce the so-called Splicing Algorithm (in Pseudo Code) that takes the set S as input and
combines its sequences into one sequence, α , while maintaining, as best as possible, the correct transi-
tion frequencies specified by {ρa : a ∈ A}:
Algorithm 1 The Splicing Algorithm
Require: An input set S =
{
αa ∈ TnP(a) : a ∈ A
}
w.r.t n and P2 (given as a set of lists); an initial value
α0 ∈ A
Ensure: A finite sequence α = (α0,α1, . . .) (unspecified length)
start a list α with α = list(α0).
for j ≥ 1 do
l = last element added to α (l ∈ A)
if α l not empty then
α j = α l[1]
α.append(α j)
del(α l[1]) (delete the element just added to α from α l)
else {algorithm terminates}
end if
end for
The following example demonstrates the mechanism of the Splicing Algorithm.
Example 2. Let A = {a,b} and let P2 = (14 , 14 , 14 , 14) so that ρa = ρb = (12 , 12). Fix n = 8. Let α0 = a and
S =
{
αa ∈ T4(ρa),αb ∈ T4(ρb)
}
, with
αa = (a,b,b,a)
αb = (b,a,b,a).
The Splicing Algorithm applied to S and α0 builds up a sequence α as follows: initiated by α0 = a, in
the first step we identify a as the last element added to α , add the first element of the sequence αa, a,
to α and delete a (i.e. the first element) from αa. After the first step we have α = (a,a) and a reduced
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sequence αa = (b,b,a). In the second step, we identify a as the last element added to α , add the first
element from the reduced sequence αa, b, to α and delete b from αa. Hence, we have α = (a,a,b) and a
further reduced sequence αa = (b,a), etc. We summarise the steps of the Algorithm in the table below.
Step αa αb α
start (a,b,b,a) (b,a,b,a) (a)
1 (b,b,a) (b,a,b,a) (a,a)
2 (b,a) (b,a,b,a) (a,a,b)
3 (b,a) (a,b,a) (a,a,b,b)
4 (b,a) (b,a) (a,a,b,b,a)
5 (a) (b,a) (a,a,b,b,a,b)
6 (a) (a) (a,a,b,b,a,b,b)
7 (a) /0 (a,a,b,b,a,b,b,a)
8 /0 /0 (a,a,b,b,a,b,b,a,a)
Table 3.1: Application of the Algorithm to Example 2
Hence, the Algorithm produces a sequence α = (a,a,b,b,a,b,b,a,a) of length 9 with second order type
P2. 
Definition 6. The sequence α produced by the Splicing Algorithm is called the output sequence. If
α ∈ An+1, i.e., if α has full length, then the algorithm exhausted all elements from the input sequences
in S, and we call α an optimal output sequence. 
Note, that the output sequence in Example 2 is optimal. Every input sequence has been exhausted
completely by the end of the algorithm. However, this is not always the case, as shown in the next
example.
Example 3. As before, let A = {a,b}, P2 = (14 , 14 , 14 , 14) and ρa = ρb = (12 , 12). Again, fix n = 8 and
α0 = a. Consider the set S =
{
αa ∈ T4(ρa),αb ∈ T4(ρb)
}
with
αa = (a,a,b,b)
αb = (a,a,b,b)
Running the Algorithm on this Example yields α = (a,a,a,b,a,b,a) ∈ A7 as shown in Table 3.2. One
can see that the sequence αb is not exhausted when the Algorithm ends. This happens since the sequence
αa is exhausted too early. 
We can observe from the two examples above that for a given n, a set of sequences S, and an initial value
α0, if the algorithm does not run until all sequences in S are exhausted, it only produces a sequence α of
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Step αa αb α
start (a,a,b,b) (a,a,b,b) (a)
1 (a,b,b) (a,a,b,b) (a,a)
2 (b,b) (a,a,b,b) (a,a,a)
3 (b) (a,a,b,b) (a,a,a,b)
4 (b) (a,b,b) (a,a,a,b,a)
5 /0 (a,b,b) (a,a,a,b,a,b)
6 /0 (b,b) (a,a,a,b,a,b,a)
Table 3.2: Application of the Algorithm to Example 3
length < n+1.
To resolve this problem, we are now going to use longer input sequences with certain properties, so that
the output sequence has a guaranteed length n+ 1. In order to do so, we now introduce another set of
sequences, a so-called set of tails, T , that we add to a given input set S. We then show that running the
algorithm on the appended sets S and T will produce a sequence α of length at least n+1.
Definition 7 (Set of Tails). Let S be an input set of the Splicing Algorithm w.r.t n and P2 as introduced
in Definition 5. Let m ∈ N s.t. for all a ∈ A, TmP(a)(ρa) 6= /0. We call
T =
{
tmP(a) ∈ TmP(a)(ρa) : a ∈ A
}
a set of tails for the input set S w.r.t. m and P2 
Notation 7. Given an input set S and a set of tails T w.r.t. n, m and P2, we denote by S⊕T the set of the
coupled sequences in S and T , i.e.,
S⊕T =
{
αnP(a)⊕ tmP(a) ∈ T(n+m)P(a)(ρa) : a ∈ A
}
,
with αnP(a)⊕ tmP(a) = (α1, . . . ,αnP(a), t1, . . . , tmP(a)). Furthermore, similar as above, if clear from the
context, then for every a ∈ A we abbreviate the sequence αnP(a)⊕ tmP(a) ∈ S⊕T to αa⊕ ta. 
Let us now run the Splicing Algorithm on an input set S that is coupled with a set of tails, T :
Example 4. We continue with Example 3 by coupling the following tails to the input set S: for m = 4,
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let T =
{
ta = (a,b), tb = (a,b)
}
. Then, S⊕T consists of the two sequences
αa⊕ ta = (a,a,b,b,a,b)
αb⊕ tb = (a,a,b,b,a,b).
Running the Algorithm on S⊕T with initial value α0 = a yields
α = (a,a,a,b,a,b,a,a,b,b,b,a) ∈ A12,
as shown in Table 3.3.
Step αa⊕ ta αb⊕ tb α
start (a,a,b,b,a,b) (a,a,b,b,a,b) (a)
1 (a,b,b,a,b) (a,a,b,b,a,b) (a,a)
2 (b,b,a,b) (a,a,b,b,a,b) (a,a,a)
3 (b,a,b) (a,a,b,b,a,b) (a,a,a,b)
4 (b,a,b) (a,b,b,a,b) (a,a,a,b,a)
5 (a,b) (a,b,b,a,b) (a,a,a,b,a,b)
6 (a,b) (b,b,a,b) (a,a,a,b,a,b,a)
7 (b) (b,b,a,b) (a,a,a,b,a,b,a,a)
8 /0 (b,b,a,b) (a,a,a,b,a,b,a,a,b)
9 /0 (b,a,b) (a,a,a,b,a,b,a,a,b,b)
10 /0 (a,b) (a,a,a,b,a,b,a,a,b,b,b)
11 /0 (b) (a,a,a,b,a,b,a,a,b,b,b,a)
Table 3.3: Application of the Splicing Algorithm to S⊕T
This example shows that adding a set of tail sequences T to a given input set S prompts the Splicing
Algorithm to run for 12 stages and does not lead to a break up before stage 8 is reached. 
The above example motivates the following Lemma:
Lemma 3. Given an input set S w.r.t. n and P2 and a set of tails T w.r.t. m and P2, then for every initial
value α0, applying the Splicing Algorithm to S⊕T produces a sequence α of length at least n+1 (i.e.,
the algorithm does not break up before reaching stage n).
Remark 8. It is not necessary to provide the proof of this Lemma here, since we are going to prove a
variant of this Lemma at a later stage (which will also be essential for the proof of Theorem 2, whereas
the result above won’t). 
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First Amendment to General Approach
Let us now compare the results so far with Step 2 in the general approach. For a given integer n ∈ N,
a distribution P2 with full support and an input S =
{
αnP(a) ∈ TnP(a)(P2(·|a)) : a ∈ A
}
, our aim was to
produce a sequence of length n+ 1, that has a second order type equal or close to P2. The Splicing
Algorithm indeed produces a sequence αn+1, but only if we add a set of tails, T , to the input set S. Even
though this addition of T preserves the first order type of the input sequences (observe, that for every
a∈ A, the input sequence αa⊕ta has - by construction - first order type ρa), we have to extend the length
of the input sequences from nP(a) to (n+m)P(a), for every a ∈ A. Therefore, the first amendment we
have to make to our general approach applies to step 1:
Step 1: - First Amendment: Let n,m ∈N, then at the beginning of each block k > 1, we need to induce
a set of sequences of the form
S⊕T =
{
αnP(a)⊕ tmP(a) ∈ T(n+m)P(a)(ρa) : a ∈ A
}
where S is an input set w.r.t. n and P2 and T is a set of tails w.r.t. m and P2.
So far, we have not yet analyzed the second order type of an output sequence of the Splicing Algorithm
applied to an extended input set S⊕T . We will see that, unfortunately, we cannot ensure that such an
output sequence has a second order type equal or close to P2.
Definition 8 (n-stage Output Sequence). Let α be the output sequence of the Splicing Algorithm applied
to S⊕T and an initial value α0. Let αn+1 denote the first n+ 1 elements of α (which is the sequence
produced after the nth stage in the algorithm). We call αn+1 the n-stage output sequence of the algorithm.
Furthermore, the conditional subsequences of αn+1 (see Definition 1) are denoted by αn+1a , for every
a ∈ A. 
Observation 2. The reader should observe, that the n-stage output sequence may have subsequences
with first order types that differ widely from the desired conditional distributions {ρa : a ∈ A}. This can
happen, since it is not guaranteed that all elements of the sequences in S⊕T are added to the output
sequence, αn+1. In particular, it may be the case that some input sequences αa⊕ ta in S⊕T are skewed
in such a way, that the subsequence of αa⊕ ta that is eventually added to αn+1, is not typical w.r.t.
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ρa. 
The above Observation shows, that we need to impose more assumptions on the input sequences in S⊕T
in order to produce an n-stage output sequence αn+1 with second order type P2. In particular, we would
like our input sequences in S⊕T to have a certain “locally typical” structure, s.t. for every a ∈ A, the
conditional subsequence αn+1a of αn+1 - no matter its length - has a first order type close to ρa. The
property we are looking for in the input sequences is called Local Typicality which will be the topic of
the next section.
3.3.2 Local Typicality
Notation 8. As before, we set A = I×J×K and denote by P2 a distribution on A2 with full support and
with (identical) marginal distribution P ∈ ∆(A). Furthermore, for all a ∈ A, let {ρa : a ∈ A} denote the
conditional distributions of P2. Note, that we don’t require P2 to have a non-empty second order type set
anymore. 
Given a distribution P over a finite set A, locally typical sequences w.r.t. P not only have a first order
type close to P, but also possess contiguous subsequences with first order type close to P. Locally typ-
ical sequences hence have the structure our input sequences in the previous section lacked so far. We
will introduce a new input set of sequences that are locally typical w.r.t. the conditional distributions
{ρa : a ∈ A}. We will then show that the Splicing Algorithm applied to this new input set produces an
n-stage output sequence αn+1 that has a second order type close to P2.
Recall that sequences with first order type close to a distribution P are called ε-typical sequences. Let
us now properly define locally typical sequences:
Definition 9 (Local Typicality). Let P be a distribution over a finite set A and let N, l ∈ N. Given a
sequence xN ∈ AN , denote by xNt,l a subsequence of l successive elements of xN starting at index t. For
every ε > 0 we call xN l-locally typical w.r.t. P, if for every t ∈ {1,2, . . . ,N− l}, xNt,l ∈ T εl (P), where
T εl (P) denotes the ε-typical set of length l w.r.t. P. We denote the set of all l-locally typical sequences
by T εN,l(P). 
The following useful result states that if N is large enough, then the empirical distribution of an l-locally
typical sequence xN w.r.t. P is also close to P:
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Lemma 4. If N > 2lε , then every l-locally typical sequence x
N ∈ T εN,l(P) is 2ε-typical w.r.t P, i.e.,
| 1N N(a|xN)−P(a)|< 2ε ∀a ∈ A.
Proof. See Appendix C.2.
Another important concept we will need in later sections is the concept of locally conditional typical
sequences, defined below.
Definition 10 (Local Conditional Typicality). Let A = I×K be a finite set and let P ∈ ∆(A) be a distri-
bution with full support and with marginals PI on I and PK on K. Furthermore, for every i ∈ I, denote by
ρ i a conditional distribution on K derived from P, i.e., for every k ∈ K, ρ i(k) = P(k|i). Let n ∈ N and
fix a locally typical sequence, xn ∈ T εn,l(PI). A sequence yn ∈ Kn is called locally conditional typical, if
for every t ∈ {1,2, . . . ,n− l}: ynt,l ∈ T εl (P|xn), where again ynt,l is a subsequence of yn of l consecutive
elements starting at index t and T εl (P|xn) is the conditional ε-typical set w.r.t. P and xn. The set of all
locally conditional typical sequences is denoted by T εn,l(P|xn). 
We now define a (new) set of input sequences for the Splicing Algorithm. The reader may observe that
the idea of adding tail sequences, as in the previous paragraphs, is incorporated into this new input set.
Definition 11 (Locally Typical Input Set S ). Fix ε > 0 and let P2 ∈ ∆(A2) be a distribution as in
Notation 8. Let n,m, l be integers that satisfy the following properties:
nP(a),mP(a) ∈ N,∀a ∈ A (3.1)
min
a∈A
nP(a)> 2lε (3.2)
min
a∈A
mP(a)> 2lε (3.3)
Setting na = nP(A), ma = mP(a) and ra = na +ma, we call every set of l-locally typical sequences of
the form
S =
{
xra ∈ T εra,l(ρa) : a ∈ A
}
a locally typical input set w.r.t. n,m, l and P2. 
Remark 9. Note, that the properties imposed on the parameters n,m and l in the above definition ensure
that the input sequences inS are 2ε-typical as stated in Lemma 4. 
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Similar to the previous section, we now want to show that the Splicing Algorithm applied to locally
typical sequences produces a sequences of length at least n+1:
Lemma 5 (The Splicing Algorithm applied to Locally Typical Sequences). Let S be a locally typical
input set w.r.t. n,m, l and P2 and let α0 ∈ A. Fix ε > 0 and let p2 = min(a,b)∈A2 P2(a,b). Then, if
n
m <
p
4ε − 2, then Splicing Algorithm applied to α0 and S yields an output sequence of length at least
n+1.
The proof of this Lemma makes use of the following notation:
Notation 9. In order to ease readability, we call for every a ∈ A an input sequence xra ∈S the row w.r.t
a, or simply row(a). Every row in S can be written as row(a) = xna⊕ xma . We call xna the body and xma
the tail of row(a) . We summarise the bodies and the tails of the rows ofS in two different sets:
the set of bodies is denoted by
B =
{
xna ∈ T εna,l(ρa) : a ∈ A
}
,
and the set of tails by
T =
{
xma ∈ T εma,l(ρa) : a ∈ A
}
,
so that
S = B⊕T.
Note, that by assumption, each body in B and each tail in T is also 2ε-typical.
Furthermore, for every pair (a,b) ∈ A2, we say that an element a in row(b) is a reference to row(a) from
row(b). If α0 = a, then α0 is also called a reference to row(a). Note that the total number of references
to row(a) from row(b) is given by N(a|xrb), and since xrb is 2ε-typical, we have
N(a|xrb)≤ rb(ρb(a)+2ε). (3.4)
Similarly, an upper bound of the number of references to row(a) from the tail of row(b) is given by
N(a|xma)≤ mb(ρb(a)+2ε). (3.5)

Proof of Lemma 5. Let α denote the output sequence of the algorithm. Towards a contradiction, assume
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that the algorithm stops before it has reached n stages, i.e., before it has added at least n elements to α .
This means that for some a∈ A, the algorithm has exhausted all elements of row(a) (i.e., it has added the
last element of row(a) to the output sequence) at some stage k, and at a later stage k′ ≥ k the algorithm
terminated by adding element a to α and k′ < n (since row(a) is exhausted, the algorithm cannot add
anymore elements from row(a) to α).
Now, let us count the maximal number of references to row(a) in α . First, note that by assumption it
is not possible that the Algorithm exhausted all elements of the bodies from each row of S ; since for
every a∈ A, the body of row(a) has na elements, the algorithm would have otherwise added ∑a∈A na = n
elements to the output sequence.
Therefore, we assume that there is at least one element a∗ ∈ A, such that the body of the correspond-
ing row has not been completely exhausted by the algorithm. This means that from row(a∗) we can
maximally count N(a|xna∗ ) references to row(a). From every other row(b), b 6= a∗, there are maximally
N(a|xrb) references to row(a) present in the output sequence α .
Finally, recall that possibly α0 is also a reference to row(a). Therefore, the maximal number of refer-
ences to row(a) that can be counted in α (denoted by maxre f (a)), is given by
maxre f (a)≤ 1+ ∑
a∗ 6=b∈A
N(a|xrb)+N(a|xna∗ )
= 1+∑
b∈A
N(a|xrb)−N(a|xma∗ )
≤ 1+∑
b∈A
rb(ρb(a)+2ε)−ma∗(ρa∗(a)−2ε)
= 1+∑
b∈A
(n+m)P(b)(ρb(a)+2ε)−mP(a∗)(ρa∗(a)−2ε)
= 1+(n+m)
(
∑
b∈A
P2(a,b)+∑
b∈A
P(b)2ε
)
−m(P2(a,a∗)−P(a∗)2ε)
= 1+(n+m)(P(a)+2ε)−m(P2(a,a∗)−P(a∗)2ε),
where the second inequality is due to the inequalities in (3.4) and (3.5). By assumption, the maximal
number of references to row(a) must be larger than the number of elements of row(a) (otherwise, the
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Algorithm would not terminate as assumed). I.e., it must hold that
(n+m)P(a)< maxre f (a)
≤ 1+(n+m)(P(a)+2ε)−m(P2(a,a∗)−P(a∗)2ε),
which is equivalent to
mP2(a,a∗)−1 < ((n+m)+mP(a∗))2ε
or
mP2(a,a∗)−1
2((n+m)+mP(a∗))
< ε. (3.6)
However, inequality (3.6) cannot be verified if nm <
p
4ε −2 holds, which we assume in the Lemma. We
can therefore conclude, that the Splicing Algorithm applied to α0 andS produces a sequence of length
at least n+1.
In the following section we can finally show that the Splicing Algorithm applied to locally typical se-
quences produces an output sequences (of length n+1) with a second order type close to P2.
3.3.3 The Second Order Type of a Typical Output Sequence
Notation 10 (n-stage Typical Output Sequence). Let S be a locally typical input set w.r.t. the integers
n,m, l and P2, that satisfy the conditions in Lemma 5. Let α denote the output sequence of the Splicing
Algorithm applied to S and an initial value α0 and denote by αn+1 the first n+ 1 elements of α . We
call αn+1 the n-stage typical output sequence and for every a ∈ A we denote by αn+1a the conditional
subsequences of αn+1. 
Remark 10. [The Difference of Rows and Conditional Subsequences] Given an n-stage typical output
sequences, αn+1, a conditional subsequence αn+1a of αn+1 is a prefix of row(a) (an input sequence of
the locally typical input set S ). More precisely, if the algorithm added all elements from row(a) to
αn+1, then row(a) = αn+1a . Otherwise, αn+1a is equal to the first elements in row(a) that were added to
αn+1. 
The last Remark raises the question of how many elements from each row of a locally typical input set
S are at least added to an n-stage typical output sequences αn+1, which we discuss in the following.
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Lemma 6. Let S be a locally typical input set w.r.t. n,m, l and P2. For every a ∈ A, the length of a
conditional subsequence αn+1a of an n-stage typical output sequence αn+1 is given by N(a|αn+1). If
m
n > mina P(a), then
N(a|αn+1)≥ (n+m)P(a)−m.
Proof. Given an element a∗ ∈ A, let’s assume that all but one row(a∗) are exhausted in the n-stage
typical output sequence αn+1, i.e., for every a 6= a∗, row(a) is the conditional subsequence of αn+1,
row(a)=αn+1a . Note that this situation describes the most extreme case in which the number of elements
from row(a∗) that are added to the output sequence is minimal. In any other situation, we would have at
least two rows (row(a∗) inclusive) that are not entirely exhausted in the output sequence. In these cases
the number of elements added from row(a∗) to the output sequence would only but increase, compared
to the situation first described. Hence, assuming that all but one row(a∗) are exhausted in the output
sequence is sufficient for our analysis. Every row(a) has length (n+m)P(a), therefore, the following
must hold for the length of αn+1
n+1 = ∑
a∈A,a6=a∗
(n+m)P(a)+N(a∗|αn+1)+1,
equivalently,
N(a∗|αn+1) = (n+m)P(a)−m.
Since mn > mina P(a), we have N(a
∗|αn+1)> 0.
Observation 3. [Conditional Subsequences are Typical] Observe, that for an n-stage typical output se-
quence αn+1 that corresponds to a locally typical input setS w.r.t. n,m, l and P2, if mn > mina P(a), then
it holds that for every a ∈ A, (n+m)P(a)−m > mP(a). Furthermore, since mP(a) > 2lε by Definition
11, it follows from Lemma 6 and Lemma 4 that every conditional subsequence αn+1a of αn+1 has a
first order type close to ρa, ∀a ∈ A. This is an important property of the conditional subsequences of
an n-stage typical output sequence. Recall, that this property was not inherent in the conditional sub-
sequences of an n-stage output sequence in the previous section, which is why we introduced locally
typical sequences. 
With the above observation, we can now finally conclude this section and show that n-stage typical
output sequences have a second order type that is close to P2.
47
Theorem 3. Let αn+1 be an n-stage typical output sequence of the Splicing Algorithm applied to a
locally typical input setS w.r.t. n,m, l and P2. Then, for all ε > 0, it holds that
∥∥emp2(αn+1)−P2∥∥TV < δ (ε),
where ‖·‖TV denotes the total variation distance1 and δ (ε) is a function with δ (ε)→ 0 as ε → 0.
In order to prove the above Theorem, we first use the fact that the function that maps a strictly positive
stochastic matrix to its (unique) stationary distribution is continuous (see Lemma below). This function
helps bounding the distance of the the stationary distribution of P2 and emp2(αn+1). Furthermore, as
noted in Observation 3, the empirical distributions of the conditional subsequences of αn+1 are 2ε- close
to the conditional probabilities of P2. These two relations will then be used to show that the distance of
emp2(αn) and P2 is close.
Lemma 7. Let A be a finite set and denote byM the set of all strictly positive stochastic matrices over
A. The mapping f :M → ∆(A), with f (P) = pi , where P ∈M with (unique) stationary distribution pi ,
is continuous.
Remark 11. Note that the function f is well-defined since f maps every strictly positive stochastic
matrix to its unique stationary distribution. 
The proof of the above Lemma is added in the Appendix.
Proof of Theorem (3). Let P be the stochastic matrix derived from P2 where the rows display the condi-
tional distributions {ρa : a ∈ A}. We denote the entries of P by p(a,b) = ρa(b), for every a,b ∈ A2.
Furthermore, denote by P˜ another stochastic matrix that we derive from the n-stage typical output
sequence αn+1: the rows of P˜ represent the empirical distributions of the conditional subsequences{
αn+1a : a ∈ A
}
, hence the entries of P˜ are denoted by p˜(a,b) = emp(αn+1a )[b] for every pair (a,b)∈ A2.
As seen in Observation 3, the conditional subsequences of αn+1 are 2ε close to the conditional distribu-
tions of P2, i.e.,
|emp(αn+1a )−ρa|< 2ε,
or, in matrix notation:
|p(a,b)− p˜(a,b)|< 2ε.
1Given two probability distributions p,q ∈ ∆(A), the total variation distance between p and q, denoted ‖p−q‖TV , is
given by maxa∈A |p(a)−q(a)|
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Let us now derive the stationary distributions of P and P˜:
First, the probability vector pi with pi(a) = P(a) =∑b∈A P2(a,b), ∀a ∈ A is obviously the unique station-
ary distribution of P.
Denote by p˜i the stationary distribution of P˜. Let αn(1) denote the sequence of α
n+1 reduced by the last
element, αn, and let αn(2) be the sequence of α
n+1 reduced by the first element α0. Assuming n large, we
set N(a|αn(1)) = N(a|αn(2)) for every a ∈ A. Setting p˜i(b) = 1n N(b|αn(2)) for every b ∈ A, yields p˜i = p˜iP˜ as
shown below:
p˜iP˜(b) = ∑
a∈A
1
n
N(a|αn(2))p˜(a,b)
=
1
n ∑a∈A
N(a|αn(2))emp(αn+1a )[b]
=
1
n ∑a∈A
N(a|αn(2))
N(b|αn+1a )
N(a|αn(1))
=
1
n ∑a∈A
N(b|αn+1a )
=
1
n
N(b|αn(2))
= p˜i(b).
Therefore, for all (a,b) ∈ A2, we have
P2(a,b) = pi(a)p(a,b), and
emp2(αn+1)[a,b] = p˜i(a)p˜(a,b).
Now, by Lemma 21, with sufficiently small ε , we have for all δ > 0 and for all (a,b) ∈ A2,
|p(a,b)− p˜(a,b)|< 2ε ⇒ |pi(a)− p˜i(a)|< δ ,
and thus
emp2(αn+1)[a,b]−P2(a,b) = p˜i(a)p˜(a,b)−pi(a)p(a,b) (3.7)
< (pi(a)+δ )(p(a,b)+2ε)−pi(a)p(a,b) (3.8)
< 2ε+δ +2δε (3.9)
49
similarly,
P2(a,b)− emp2(αn+1)[a,b]< 2ε+δ +2δε.
Letting δ = ε completes the proof.
Second Amendment to General Approach
With the application of the Splicing Algorithm on locally typical sequences we are able to achieve an
output sequence of length at least n+ 1 that also has a second order type close to P2, as desired. Step
2 in the general approach can therefore be achieved, if we make the necessary changes in Step 1 of the
general approach:
Step 1 - Second Amendment Fix ε > 0 and let n,m, l be integers with 1p <
n
m <
p2
4ε − 2, where p =
mina P(a) and p2 = mina,bP2(a,b). At the beginning of each block k > 1 we need to induce a locally
typical input setS w.r.t. n,m, l and P2.
In the following sections, we will therefore focus on this amended Step 1.
3.4 Sequence Induction
In the previous sections, we developed which sequences need to be induced, so that they can be spliced
to produce a sequence with a second order type that is close to P2. In these upcoming sections, we show
how these sequences can be induced, i.e., how the strategies of the players need to be constructed to
induce these sequences.
In the following, we will refer to a distribution P2 with properties stated below. Even though this notation
has been used in the previous sections, we only add additional properties to (the former) P2, and hence
the results in the previous sections also hold for this distribution.
Notation 11. Let ε > 0. Denote by P2 a distribution over A2, A = I× J×K, with full support that
satisfies the properties stated in Theorem 2. That is,
• The marginal of P2 on the first and the second coordinates is identical and given by P ∈ ∆(A).
50
• For every a ∈ A, the marginal of the conditional distribution P2(·|a) on I is µ .
• P2 fulfills the following information constraint: HP2(i, j|k, i′, j′,k′)−HP2(i)≥ ε ,
where (i, j,k, i′, j′,k′)∼ P2.
Furthermore, we denote by {ρa : a ∈ A} the conditional distributions of P2, i.e., for all a ∈ A, P2(·|a) =
ρa. The marginal distribution of ρa on I, K, I×K, etc., are denoted by ρaI , ρaK , ρaI×K , respectively. 
The strategies we are going to construct will implement a distribution P2 as denoted above.
Remark 12. Recall, that by Lemma 16 in the Appendix, for a given distribution P′2 ∈ ∆((I× J×K)2)
which satisfies the properties stated in Theorem 2, for every ε > 0 there exists a distribution P2 ∈ ∆((I×
J×K)2) with full support and equal properties as P′2, such that ‖P′2−P2‖ < 2ε . If we can show that
such a distribution P2 is implementable, then P′2 is also implementable, since the set of implementable
distributions is closed by Remark 25. 
3.4.1 Strategy Outline
In the following paragraphs we only provide an outline of the strategies that will implement P2. The
details of the strategy construction will be discussed in the subsequent section.
First of all, we divide the game that is induced by the strategies of the players and by the actions of
nature, into blocks of a given length n. We associate to every such block k an input set, denoted byS [k].
Such an input set consists of an input set for nature,SI[k], forecaster,SJ[k] and agent,SI[k], such that
S [k] =SI[k]×SJ[k]×SK [k].
Denote by αn[k] = (x[k],y[k],z[k]) ∈ (I× J×K)n the actual elements played by the players in block k.
We want this sequence of action triples to have a second order type close to P2. We can accomplish this
with the following approach:
We construct strategies, such that for given integers n,m, l ∈N and ε > 0, in asymptotically almost every
block k > 1, an input setS [k] is induced that is locally typical w.r.t. n,m, l and P2 according to Definition
11. Once this is accomplished, we run the Splicing Algorithm on S [k]. By Lemma 5, this produces a
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typical n-stage output sequence for block k of length n+1, which we denote by
αn+1[k] = (α0[k],α1[k], . . . ,αn[k]).
We set α0[k] = αn[k− 1], i.e., α0[k] is the last element of the sequence in block k− 1. For every
j ∈ [0, . . .n], we write α j[k] = (x j[k],y j[k],z j[k]) ∈ I × J ×K to denote the actions of the individual
players in stage j in block k.
Recall, that by Theorem 3, the second order type of αn+1[k] gets arbitrarily close to P2 in the total vari-
ation norm as n→ ∞.
For the above approach to work, the sequences inS [k] need to satisfy certain requirements. First of all,
the parameters n,m, l ∈ N and ε need to be chosen such that they satisfy the properties in Definition 11
and in Lemma 5. Moreover, the sequences in the input setS [k] must be ε-typical w.r.t. the conditional
distributions of P2, {ρa : a ∈ A}. In order to achieve this, we impose the following conditions on the
input sets of nature, forecaster and agent:
Conditions on the Input Sets
Let ε > 0. For every a ∈ A, setting ra = (n+m)P(a), the following conditions must hold on the input
set of nature, of the forecaster and of the agent:
SI[k] 3 xra ∈ T εra,l(ρaI ) (3.10)
SK [k] 3 zra ∈ T εra,l(ρaI×K |xra) for xra ∈SI[k] (3.11)
SJ[k] 3 yra ∈ T εra,l(ρa|xra ,zra) for xra ∈SI[k],zra ∈SK [k]. (3.12)
Note that the input sequences of the forecaster are assumed to be locally conditional typical sequences
according to Definition (10), and so it must hold that for every sequence (xra ,yra ,zra)∈ (SI[k]×SJ[k]×
SK [k]),
(xra ,yra ,zra) ∈ T εra,l(ρa).
The reader should observe that the concept of local conditional typicality keeps ε fix, i.e., there is no
need for any change on ε . Therefore, the input set S [k] = (SI[k]×SJ[k]×SK [k]) that satisfies the
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conditions in (3.10), (3.11) and in (3.12) indeed satisfies all properties of a locally typical input set ac-
cording to Definition 11. Moreover, by Lemma 5, there is an n-stage output sequence αn+1[k] of the
Splicing Algorithm applied toS [k], that has a second order type close to P2 according to Theorem 3.
The strategies we will construct are designed such that the input set of the agent and of the forecaster,
SK [k] and SJ[k], have the properties stated in (3.11) and (3.12). Note, that the input set of nature may
not always have the desired property in (3.10).
Remark 13. [Nature’s Input Set] The sequences in SI[k] are segments from nature’s conditional se-
quences which are fixed from the beginning of the play. Obviously, we cannot guarantee that nature
will play xra ∈ T εra,l(ρaI ) for every a ∈ A, as in (3.10). However, we know that this happens with high
frequency throughout the game by Lemma 18 in the Appendix. We will later discuss what we do in case
nature does not play as in (3.10). 
So far, we have outlined what the strategies of the players need to achieve, namely the induction of
an input set S [k] w.r.t. n,m, l and P2. As announced, we will provide the detailed construction of the
strategies in the upcoming section. In the remaining part of this section, we take a step ahead and present
a simplified overview of how the players act under the strategies we are about to construct. The purpose
of this proceeding is to introduce the key features of the strategies in an informal way. Thereby, the
reader is given an idea of the strategies, before we immerse into the details of their construction.
How the Players Act
In the following, let us assume that a play is initiated by the strategies of the players, that can induce a
locally typical input setS [k] with properties stated in (3.10),(3.11) and (3.12) in every block (note, that
this is an idealised assumption, since by Remark 13, property (3.10) may not always be satisfied).
First, recall that at the beginning of the play, the agent has no knowledge about future states of nature,
nor of the future play of the forecaster, whereas the forecaster has complete knowledge about all future
states of nature’s conditional sequences. Note, however, that the agent (as well as the forecaster) can
observe the complete history of the play at any stage in the game.
53
In order to know her input setSK [k] at the beginning of a block k > 1, the agent has to rely on her obser-
vation of the past play. Since we want SK [k] to be chosen in dependence of SI[k] as in (3.11), it is the
task of the forecaster to send the necessary information in block k−1 to the agent. More precisely, the
forecaster conditions her actions in block k−1 on nature’s actions in block k in such a way, that it will
transmit sufficient information to the agent to know SK [k] at the beginning of the block. At the same
time, the forecaster also conditions her actions in SJ[k−1] on SI[k−1] and on SK [k−1] as indicated
in (3.12), such that the input setS [k−1] is locally typical as desired.
We refer to information transmission as the process of sending and receiving information about future
states of nature. More precisely, we say that information transmission from block k−1 to block k from
the forecaster to the agent is possible, if the forecaster is able to send enough information to the agent
in block k− 1, so that the agent knows SK [k] at the beginning of block k, while at the same time the
forecaster can match nature’s and agent’s actions in block k−1, so that the input setS [k−1] is induced.
Hence, information transmission is the key feature of the strategies of the players. Let us now shortly
demonstrate that in order for the information transmission to work, the information constraint plays a
vital role.
First, we will see that the information transmission process is formalised with the introduction of a Mes-
sage Set of the forecaster and a Set of Action Plans of the agent, which we will properly define in the
upcoming sections. Next, we show that the information transmission process can only work, if the mes-
sage set is larger in size than the set of action plans. Only then it is possible for the forecaster to send
enough information about future states of nature to the agent, so that the agent can deduce the desired
actions. Finally, we will see that the information constraint can guarantee that the relative sizes of the
message set and the set of action plans are as required.
In the next paragraphs, we intend to provide a first idea of the functioning of a message and of an action
plan.
A message of the forecaster in block k−1 is a subset of the input set of the forecaster,SJ[k−1]. It has
the property that every element in the message appears in the output sequence, αn+1[k−1], so that at the
beginning of the next block, k, the agent is able to observe the message. In every block k−1, k > 1, the
forecaster sends a message to the agent, that entails information about a so-called Hypothetical Input Set
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of Nature of block k, which we denote by I [k]. This set consists of those segments of the conditional
sequences of nature, that contain the sequences of the actual input set of nature, SI[k]. More precisely,
every sequence in SI[k] is a middle segment of a sequence in I [k]. Hence, the forecaster sends more
information in her message to the agent, than what will actually be needed. Let us illustrate this idea
with the two figures below:
Figure 3.1: Input Sequences
Every row in Figure 3.1 represents an input sequence of the locally typical input set S [k−1]. In every
such row we add an orange suffix and a green pointer. To understand these additions, recall that when
applying the Splicing Algorithm to a locally typical input set, not necessarily every element of an input
sequence is eventually added to the output sequence. However, Lemma 6 informs us of the minimal
number of elements from an input sequence that are added to the output sequence ((n+m)P(a)−m).
Now, the orange suffix marks those elements that are potentially not added to the output sequence, i.e.,
there are exactly (n+m)P(a)−m elements to the left of the orange suffix. Now, the the green pointer
can only move in the orange suffix and indicates exactly the number of elements that are added to the
output sequence, i.e., all elements to the left of the green pointer. The elements to the right of the pointer
do not appear in the output sequence of block k−1. The green pointers also marks the beginning of the
next block, k. I.e., it marks the starting points for the input sequences ofS [k].
Figure 3.2 focuses on one single row from Figure 3.1 (with two additional dashed boxes added) and
demonstrates the procedure of the Information Transmission. As before, the row represents an input
sequence from the input setS [k−1], this time it is divided into the three sequences of nature, forecaster
and agent (in that order). Here, we can see, that the message (i.e., an element of the message) of the
forecaster is placed before the orange suffix. It includes information about the hypothetical input set of
nature (a sequence of the same), which begins right after the minimal length of the sequence of the input
set of nature in S [k− 1] (marked as a blue dashed box). Then, at the beginning of block k (indicated
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Figure 3.2: Information Transmission
by the green pointers), the agent observes the message of the forecaster in block k− 1, as well as the
complete history of the play (not included in the figures above). From that, she deduces a so-called
action plan, which is a set of sequences that contains her input set SK [k] for block k. In Figure 3.2
we marked one sequence of the action plan (the red dashed box). The action plan has the property that
it matches the hypothetical input set of nature in the same way as the agent’s input set SK [k] matches
nature’s setSI[k] as stated in (3.11). With the help of her observation of the past play, the agent is then
able to extract her input set from her action plan.
This outline of how the players act is certainly not exhaustive, as indicated before. The following section
will now add the details to this mechanism.
3.4.2 Information Transmission
In this section we look at the features of the strategies introduced in the previous passages in more
depths. In particular, we define the hypothetical input set of nature, as well as the the message set of the
forecaster and the set of action plans of the agent. We begin with the definition of a set of parameters
that we are going to employ.
Definition 12. [Fit Parameters] Let A= I×J×K and let ε > 0. Let P2 be a distribution over A2 as given
in Notation 11. We call the set {P2,ε,n,m, l} a set of fit parameters, if the following holds:
• mina∈A nP(a)> 2lε
• mina∈A mP(a)> 2lε
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• l > ln(2n|A|)2ε2
• 1p < nm < p24ε −2
where p = mina∈A P(a) and p2 = mina,b∈A2 P2(a,b).

Definition 13. We say that a set of fit parameters {P2,ε,n,m, l} behaves asymptotically appropriately,
if there exists a function v(ε) with v(ε)→ 0 as ε → 0 and
m
n < v(ε).

Remark 14. Note, that a set of fit parameters as given in Definition 12 obviously exists whenever n,m
are assumed to be sufficiently large. Furthermore, one can find a set of fit parameters, {P2,ε,n,m, l}, that
behaves asymptotically appropriately with v(ε) = γε , where γ ∈ R is sufficiently large (γ > 4p2−8ε ). 
Next, we need to introduce some notation regarding the structure of a play:
Notation 12. We say that a game induced by the strategies of the players and nature is an induced play.
In an induced play, denote by αk−1 the entire past sequence of actions played up until the beginning
of (and not including) block k. Furthermore, denote by N(a|αk−1) the number of occurrences of a in
αk−1. 
In the following sections, we will often refer to an induced play, without having specified the strategies
of the players yet. The reader should observe, however, that in doing so, we do not presuppose cer-
tain features of the strategies and only need to describe the correct setting, that is independent of the
strategies.
The Hypothetical Input Set of Nature
Nature’s Conditional Sequences: First, recall that at the beginning of a game, nature draws for every
a ∈ A and according to µ , an infinite conditional sequence (xa1,xa2, . . .) of states, which the forecaster
observes. Remember, that if at stage t in the course of a game, element a is played, i.e., (xt ,yt ,zt) = a,
then nature plays xt+1 = xai , if a has occurred i times in the history of the game up until stage t.
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Remark 15. At the beginning of each block k ≥ 1 in an induced play, the forecaster can observe the
entire past sequence of actions played by nature, forecaster and agent, αk−1. For every a ∈ A, she can
also work out N(a|αk−1). Therefore, the forecaster knows nature’s input set in block k,SI[k], since she
can observe all the elements nature will play after the upcoming occurrences of elements a ∈ A, i.e.,
forecaster observes
SI[k] 3 xra [k] = (x1[k], . . . ,xra [k]) = (xaN(a|αk−1),xaN(a|αk−1)+1, . . . ,xaN(a|αk−1)+ra−1).

To be precise, the forecaster not only knowsSI[k], but the entire future conditional sequences of nature.
However, this is not what she will transmit to the agent (this is obviously too much information). The
forecaster restricts her knowledge that she transmits to the so-called hypothetical input set of nature:
Definition 14 (The Hypothetical Input Set of Nature). Let {P2,ε,n,m, l} be a set of fit parameters. Let
k be a block in an induced play, such that S [k] is a locally typical input set w.r.t. n,m, l and P2. The
hypothetical input set of nature of block k+1, denoted by I [k+1], is a set of |A| segments of nature’s
conditional sequences {xa : a ∈ A}, with the property that for every a ∈ A, a segment has length ra +m
and is locally typical w.r.t. µ:
S [k+1] =
{
ιra+m[k+1] ∈ T εra+m,l(µ) : a ∈ A
}
,
where for every a ∈ A, the segment ιra+m[k+1] ∈I [k+1] has the following start and end points:
ιra+m[k+1] =
(
xaminN(a|αk), . . . ,x
a
maxN(a|αk)+ra
)
,
where minN(a|αk) = N(a|αk−1)+ ra−m and maxN(a|αk) = N(a|αk−1)+ ra. 
It should be observed that the hypothetical input set of nature contains locally typical sequences w.r.t.
µ . Again, it is not guaranteed that nature’s conditional sequences are of these types, but if they are,
it will be this set which the forecaster informs the agent about. The following remark provides some
motivation and further explanation for the introduction of a hypothetical input set.
Remark 16. Let αn+1[k] be the n-stage output sequence of the Splicing Algorithm applied to a locally
typical input set S [k]. For every a ∈ A, the length of a subsequence αn+1a [k] of αn+1[k], denoted by
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L(αn+1a [k]), is given by
ra−m≤ L(αn+1a [k])≤ ra, with ra = (n+m)P(a), (3.13)
by Lemma 6 (recall, that L(αn+1a [k]) = N(a|αn+1[k]) for all a ∈ A). As noted in Remark 10, we can
see here again that a conditional subsequence αn+1a [k] of αn+1 is not necessarily equal to the respec-
tive input sequence αra [k] ∈S [k]. αn+1a [k] is only a prefix of αra [k]. Hence, since the lengths of the
subsequences
{
αn+1a [k] : a ∈ A
}
can vary in between the interval (3.13), and since these lengths (equiva-
lently, the numbers N(a|αn+1[k]), for a∈ A) determine nature’s actions in block k+1, we introduced the
hypothetical input set of nature, that takes into account the shortest possible lengths of the conditional
subsequences of the output sequence in block k. Finally, note, that obviously the input set of nature is a
subset of the hypothetical input set of nature in block k+1, i.e.,SI[k+1]⊂I [k+1]. 
Observation 4 (Elements Added and Elements Discarded). Since not all elements from each sequence
inS [k] are added to the output sequence αn+1[k], the question arises of what to do with unused elements,
i.e., elements of sequences in S [k] that are not added to αn+1[k]. Given the bounds of a conditional
subsequence (3.13), there may be up to m unused, or unadded elements of every locally typical input
sequence αra [k] ∈S [k]. While we can simply discard the unused elements of forecaster and agent, and
then start anew in a locally typical input set in the next block, we cannot simply discard the unused
elements of nature. In other words, unused elements of nature in the input sequences in S [k] have to
reappear in the input set in the next block,S [k+1], while unused elements of forecaster and agent can
be discarded. 
The Set of Action Plans of the Agent
Let us now look at the concept of an action plan of the agent in more detail. As indicated in the outline
of the strategies, the action plan is a set of |A| sequences of length ra+m for every a ∈ A, that matches
a given hypothetical input set of nature, I [k] in block k (that is only observed by the forecaster in the
previous block) in the following sense. If κra+m denotes a sequence in the action plan, then for every
a ∈ A, it holds that
(ιra+m[k],κra+m) ∈ T εra+m,l(ρaI×K), for every a ∈ A,
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where ιra+m[k] ∈ I [k]. The action plan can hence be regarded as an extension of the input set of the
agent for block k. In fact, an important feature of the action plan is that upon observing the past play
until block k, the agent is able to extract her input set SK [k] from the action plan. Let us now properly
define the set of action plans for the agent. The reader may observe the similarity to the Definition of
the set of action plans in [6].
Definition 15 (The Set of Action Plans of the Agent). Let {n,m, l,ε,P2} be a set of fit parameters. Given
a ∈ A, we say that the set of action plans w.r.t. a, denoted by APa, is a subset of T εra+m,l(ρaK) of minimal
size, s.t. for all x ∈ T εra+m,l(ρaI ), there exists an element z ∈ APa, with (x,z) ∈ T εra,l(ρaI×K). The (total) set
of action plans is given by AP, with
AP = ×
a∈A
APa.
Elements of AP will be denoted byK . 
The size of the set of action plans for the agent plays an important role in the construction of the strate-
gies, which is stated below.
Lemma 8. [The Size of the Set of Action Plans] Let {n,m, l,ε,P2} be a set of asymptotically fit param-
eters. Let a denote a random triple in A = I× J×K, and let (i, j,k,a) denote two random triples in A2
with (i, j,k,a)∼ P2. Further, let λ (ε) be a function of ε with λ (ε)→ 0 as ε → 0. Then,
|AP| ≤ 2(1+λ (ε))n(H(k|a)−H(k|i,a)+ξ (ε)),
for ξ (ε) = 3c˜ε , with c˜ =−∑k∈K logPK(k).
Proof. Let (ia,ka) denote a pair of random variables distributed according to ρaI×K . By Theorem 7 in
the Appendix, for every a ∈ A and for every ξ > 2c˜ε , there exists a set of action plans w.r.t element a of
size
|APa|= 2na(1+λa)(H(ka)−H(ka|ia)+ξ ),
with λa = mn (1+
1
P(a)). Since
m
n < v(ε), we have λa < v(ε)(1+
1
p), with p = mina∈A P(a). Setting
ξ = ξ (ε) = 3c˜ε ,
|APa|= 2na(1+λa)(H(ka)−H(ka|ia)+ξ (ε))
< 2na(1+λ (ε))(H(k
a)−H(ka|ia)+ξ (ε)).
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Since AP =×a∈A APa, we have |AP|=∏a∈A |APa| and
∏
a∈A
|APa|<∏
a∈A
2na(1+λ (ε))(H(k
a)−H(ka|ia)+ξ (ε)) (3.14)
= 2n(1+λ (ε))(H(k|a)−H(k|i,a)+ξ (ε)). (3.15)
We now show that at the beginning of every block k > 1, the agent is able to deduce an input set SK [k]
from her observation of the past play, and, in particular, from her observation of an action plan.
Remark 17. In the later construction of the strategies we will see that if the agent is able to deduce
an action plan K ∈ AP from her observation of the past play at the beginning of some block k, then
this must have been possible due to the forecaster’s ability to observe a hypothetical input set in block
k, I [k] (and her transmission of information of the same to the agent). This remark is vital for the
following lemma. 
Lemma 9. Assume, that in block k−1, k > 1, the forecaster and the agent are able to induce a locally
typical input set S [k− 1]. Moreover, assume that the agent can deduce an action plan K ∈ AP from
her observation of the past play. Then, the agent is able to construct an input setS [k] fromK for block
k, that satisfies property (3.11).
Proof. Recall, that given the assumptions stated in the current lemma, the action plan K , received by
the agent at the beginning of block k, corresponds to a hypothetical input set of nature, that was observed
by the forecaster in block k−1. Observe, that since every κra+m ∈K is locally conditional typical, i.e.,
κra+m ∈ T εra+m,l(ρaI×K |ιra+m[k]) for every a ∈ A, then by Definition 10, every subsequence of ra con-
secutive elements of κra+m is also locally conditional typical. Hence, the only thing the agent needs
to do, is to determine the correct segment in κra+m of length ra for every a ∈ A, which will constitute
the set SK [k]. For this, the agent needs to observe the ending points of each conditional subsequence
αn+1a [k− 1] of the output sequence αn+1[k− 1]. These ending points determine the starting points for
the sequences in the input set S [k] of block k (these ending points are equivalent to the green pointers
in Figures 3.1 and 3.2).
In order to compute the exact ending points of each conditional subsequence, she needs to observe, for
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every a ∈ A, the number of occurrences of a in the past play up to block k− 1, N(a|αk−2), as well as
the number of occurrences of element a in block k− 1, given by L(αn+1a [k− 1]). Inequality (3.13) in
Remark 16 tells us that
ra−m≤ L(αn+1a [k−1])≤ ra.
The sequence in the action plan and in the hypothetical input set start right after the minimal length of
L(αn+1a [k− 1]), as was demonstrated in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. Therefore, if L(αn+1a [k− 1]) > ra−m,
the agent needs to cut the first L(αn+1a [k− 1])− (ra −m) elements of the prefix of κra+m, for ev-
ery a ∈ A. Since for every a ∈ A a sequence in SK [k] has ra elements, we need to make sure that
redundant elements at the end of κra+m are also cut off. This means that the agent needs to cut
ra+m−
(
L(αn+1a [k−1])− (ra−m)
)
elements in the suffix of κra+m.
Note, that nature proceeds in exactly the same way. The resulting sequences, denoted by (ιra [k],κra),
have the desired length ra. Hence, {ιra [k] : a ∈ A} are the sequences of nature’s input set, SI[k], and
{κra : a ∈ A}, are the desired sequences of agent’s input set,SK [k].
The Message Set of the Forecaster
Before we define the message set of the forecaster, let us give an overview of the main properties of a
message:
A message of the forecaster in block k consists of a set of sequences, one for every a ∈ A. Every such
sequence is of length ra−m, and is therefore shorter than a sequence in the forecaster’s input set,SJ[k].
However, one important feature of a message is its extendability, i.e., a message can be extended into
an input setSJ[k], that satisfies the property stated in (3.12). Another important feature of a message is
its ability to transmit the forecaster’s knowledge of the hypothetical input setI [k+1] to the agent. The
following paragraphs will look at these properties now in more detail.
Let us first introduce the concept of extendability:
Definition 16 (Extendable Locally Conditional Typical Sequence). Let P ∈ ∆(I× J) be a distribution
with marginal distribution PI ∈ ∆(I). Furthermore, let n,m, l ∈ N be integers with n,m > l and let
xn+m ∈ T εn+m,l(PI) be a locally typical sequence. Note, that the sequences of the first n and of the last
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m elements of xn+m, denoted by xn and xm, respectively, are also locally typical w.r.t. PI . We say
that a locally conditional typical sequence yn ∈ T εn,l(P|xn) is m-extendable, if there exists a sequence
ym ∈ T εm,l(P|xm), s.t. the concatenation of yn and ym, yn⊕ym, is an element of T εn+m,l(P|xn+m). We denote
the set of m-extendable locally conditional typical sequences by T εn,l(P|xn,ext(m)). 
The message set of the forecaster is an extendable locally conditional typical set in the following sense:
Definition 17 (The Message Set of the Forecaster). Let {P2,ε,n,m, l} be a set of fit parameters that
behaves asymptotically appropriately. Furthermore, let SI[k] and SK [k] denote the input sets of nature
and of the agent in block k, that satisfy the properties stated in (3.10) and in (3.11), respectively. For
every a ∈ A, set ra = (n+m)P(a) and denote by (xra−m,zra−m) the prefix of the first ra−m elements of
(xra ,zra) ∈SI[k]×SK [k]. The message set of the forecaster w.r.t. an element a ∈ A, denoted by Mak , is
then given by the m-extendable locally conditional typical set
Mak = T
ε
ra−m,l(ρ
a|(xra−m,zra−m),ext(m)).
The (total) message set, Mk, is given by
Mk = ×
a∈A
Mak .

Remark 18 (Length of a Message). Note, that for every a ∈ A, a sequence in a message is of length
ra−m. This is no coincidence. Recall, the minimal length of a conditional subsequence αn+1a of the
output sequence αn+1 has the same length, as stated in (3.13). A message of length ra−m hence ensures
that it will appear in the output sequence (any message of a longer length might not fully appear in the
output sequence). 
Remark 19. [Extending a Message to a Locally Typical Input Set] By Definition 16, for every a ∈ A
and for every pair (xra ,zra) ∈SI[k]×SK [k], a sequence yra−m ∈ Mak can be m-extended to a sequence
yra ∈ T εra,l(ρa|(xra ,zra)). The set of these m-extended sequences is exactly the conditional locally typical
input setSJ[k] stated in (3.12). 
With the help of Corollary 10 in the Appendix, we can now derive the size of the message set.
Lemma 10 (The Size of the Message Set). Let ε > 0 and let δ (ε) be a function of ε such that δ (ε)→ 0 as
ε → 0. Furthermore, with a= (i′, j′,k′), denote by (a, i, j,k) two triples of random variables distributed
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according to P2 Then, for every δ > 0 and for n sufficiently large,
|Mk| ≥ 2(1−δ (ε))n(H(j|i,k,a)−2εd−δ ),
with d = ∑a∈A H(j|i,k,a= a)
Proof. By Corollary 10 (in the Appendix), with d = ∑a∈A H(j|i,k,a = a), we can bound the message
set of the forecaster with respect to an element a ∈ A as follows:
|Mak |> 2(ra−m)(H(j|i,k,a)−2εd−δ ).
Now, since we assumed that the set of fit parameters {P2,ε,n,m, l} behaves asymptotically appropriately,
there exists a function v(ε) with v(ε)→ 0 for ε → 0. Setting δ (ε) = v(ε)mina∈A P(a) and na = nP(a), note
that we can deduce the following bound for ra−m for every a ∈ A:
ra−m = (n+m)P(a)−m
= na(1+ mn − mnP(a))
> na(1− mnP(a))
> na(1− v(ε)mina∈A P(a))
= na(1−δ (ε)).
Therefore,
|Mk|=∏
a∈A
|Mak |
>∏
a∈A
2(ra−m)(H(j|i,k,a)−2εd−δ )
> 2∑a∈A na(1−δ (ε))(H(j|i,k,a)−2εd−δ )
= 2n(1−δ (ε))∑a∈A P(a)(H(j|i,k,a)−2εd−δ )
= 2n(1−δ (ε))(H(j|i,k,a)−2εd−δ ).
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The Role of the Information Constraint
The information constraint is a vital element in the construction of the strategies of the players. Only
with the help of the information constraint we can show that information transmission from the fore-
caster to the agent is possible. We elaborate on this in the following paragraphs.
In the following Corollary we introduce the so-called transmission function:
Corollary 1. Let {P2,ε,n,m, l} be a set of fit parameters that behaves asymptotically appropriately.
Given a message set for block k, Mk, and given the set of action plans, AP, there exists a surjective
mapping fk : Mk→ AP, as ε → 0. We call fk the transmission function w.r.t. block k.
Proof. We show that |Mk| ≥ |AP| as ε → 0.
Let a = (i′, j′,k′) and let (i, j,k,a)∼ P2.. As stated in Notation 11, P2 satisfies the following information
constraint:
H(i, j|k,a)≥ H(i)+ ε. (3.16)
Now, by Lemma 8, we have
|AP| ≤ 2(1+λ (ε))n(H(k|a)−H(k|i,a)+ξ (ε)),
with λ (ε)→ 0 and ξ (ε)→ 0 as ε → 0.
Further, setting δ = ε in Lemma 10, we get
|Mk| ≥ 2(1−δ (ε))n(H(j|i,k,a)−2εd−ε).
We now show that
H(j|i,k,a)− ε ≥ H(k|a)−H(k|i,a). (3.17)
First, applying the chain rule, we get
H(j|i,k,a)− ε = H(i, j|k,a)−H(i|k,a)− ε (3.18)
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Next, since by assumption, H(i|a) = H(µ) = H(i), we have
H(k|a)−H(k|i,a) = H(k|a)− (H(k, i|a)−H(i|a))
=−(H(k|a)+H(i|k,a)−H(k|a))+H(i)
= H(i)−H(i|k,a). (3.19)
Therefore, by equations (3.18) and (3.19), the inequality in (3.17) is equivalent to
H(i, j|k,a)−H(i|k,a)− ε ≥ H(i)−H(i|k,a),
which is equivalent to the information constraint stated in (3.16).
The result follows by setting ε → 0.
Our aim is to describe the process of the the information transmission in detail. In order to do so, we
need the transmission function and the action plan function, which we denote in the following:
Notation 13. By the construction of the set of action plans, AP, we can define the following surjective
function,
fAP : HI→ AP,
where HI =×a∈A T εra+m,l(µ), i.e., HI includes all possible hypothetical input sets of nature. 
Definition 18 (Information Transmission-Process). Let {P2,ε,n,m, l} denote a set of parameters that
behaves asymptotically appropriately. Let us assume that there exist strategies, that together with na-
ture’s actions, induce a play. Denote by k and k+ 1 two consecutive blocks in the play, s.t. in block k
the players are able to induce a locally typical input set S [k] w.r.t. n,m, l and P2. We call the sending
and the receiving of information, as outlined below, the information transmission-process:
Sending Information:
1. At the beginning of block k, the forecaster observes the hypothetical input set of nature of block
k+1, I [k+1].
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2. The forecaster then computes the corresponding action plan for the agent using the action plan
function, i.e., fAP(I [k+1]) = κ ∈ AP.
3. This information is sent to the agent in block k via the transmission function, i.e., the forecaster
chooses a messageMk ∈ f−1k (κ)⊂Mk.
Receiving Information:
1. At the beginning of block k+1, the agent observes the past play up to and including block k, αk.
In particular, she observes the messageMk in the output sequence αn+1[k].
2. The agent receives her action plan by applying the transmission function to the message, i.e.,
fk(Mk) =K .

Corollary 2 (Inducing P2). Given the assumptions in Definition 18, the information transmission pro-
cess over two consecutive blocks k and k+ 1 defines strategies for the players such that in block k+ 1
distribution P2 is induced via a locally typical input setS [k+1].
Proof. First of all, the hypothetical input set of nature in block k+1,I [k+1], satisfies property (3.10),
since the sequences in I [k+ 1] are locally typical w.r.t. µ . Moreover, as described in Definition 18,
at the beginning of block k+ 1, the agent receives an action plan fk(Mk) = K that was sent to her
by a message from the forecaster, Mk, in block k. By Lemma 9, the agent can extract an input set
SK [k+1] from her action planK that satisfies property (3.11). The actions of the forecaster depend on
her observation of nature’s actions: If the forecaster observes a hypothetical input set for the upcoming
block, I [k+ 2], she first computes the corresponding action plan for the agent, fAP(I [k+ 2]) =K ′
and then chooses a message Mk+1 ∈ f−1k+1(K ′) ⊂ Mk+1. By Remark 19, the forecaster then extends
Kk+1 into an input setSJ[k+1], that satisfies property (3.12). Otherwise, if the the forecaster does not
observe a hypothetical input set for the upcoming block, she can directly choose an input set SJ[k+1]
as in (3.12) (which does not contain a message).
Hence, by construction, the set
SI[k+1]×SJ[k+1]×SK [k+1] =S [k+1]
constitutes a locally typical input set w.r.t. n,m, l and P2.
67
Observation 5. The reader should observe that for the information transmission process to work, it is
necessary that the forecaster indeed observes a hypothetical input set of nature. In particular, this means
that the sequences in I [k+ 1] are locally typical w.r.t. µ . Otherwise, the forecaster is unable to find
an action plan for the agent and the players cannot induce a locally typical input set S [k+ 1] in block
k+1. 
Notation 14. If, as described in the above observation, the forecaster cannot observe a hypothetical
input set of nature in block k+1, then we say that the information transmission failed and block k+1 is
then called a lost block. 
Restarting after a Lost Block
If the players have encountered a lost block, it is not the end of the world. First, we know that by Lemma
18 in the Appendix, this does not happen frequently, and second, it is possible to resume the information
transmission process. Obviously, this only depends on nature’s conditional sequences. Once they are
locally typical again, the players can restart. However, since the information transmission has failed
before, the players cannot immediately induce the desired distribution P2 (since the agent does not have
the necessary information). More precisely, we need a recovery process of at least two blocks: if a
block k is lost, then the earliest block in which the players can induce a distribution P2 again is block
k+ 2 (assuming nature plays typical). To see that, it is important to note that in a lost block we don’t
have a mechanism (such as the Splicing Algorithm) that helps us to control the length of the conditional
subsequences in that block. Therefore, it is impossible for the forecaster with the tools at hand to send
any information of future states of nature in the lost block to the agent (so that they are able to induce
a distribution P2 in the block following a lost block). Instead, if nature plays locally typical again after
a lost block, we show that a different distribution, Q2, can be induced in the block after a lost block
(for which no previous information transmission is needed) which enables the information transmission
process to work again (to induce P2) thereafter.
The following Lemma focuses on the first block after a lost block in which the players can induce such
a distribution Q2.
Lemma 11. Let Q = µ×UJ , where UJ denotes the uniform distribution over J. Fix z ∈ K, set A˜ = I×
J× z and denote by Q2 =Q×Q a distribution over A˜2. Furthermore, let {P2,ε,n,m, l} be a set of fit pa-
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rameters, such that nQ(a˜),mQ(a˜)∈N, for all a˜∈ A˜. Set ra˜ = (n+m)Q(a˜). Finally, let k∗ denote the first
block after a lost block in which SI[k∗] satisfies property (3.10), i.e., SI[k∗] =
{
xra˜ ∈ T εra˜,l(µ) : a˜ ∈ A˜
}
.
Then, the players are able to induce Q2 in block k∗.
Proof. We show that the players can induce a locally typical input set S [k∗] w.r.t. n,m, l and Q2, such
that the corresponding output sequence of the Splicing Algorithm applied to S [k∗] has a second order
type close to Q2. To this end, we need {Q2,ε,n,m, l} to be a set of fit parameters (note, that we only
replaced P2 by Q2 in the above set of fit parameters), which we demonstrate below:
Denote by
{
λ a˜ : a˜ ∈ A˜} the conditional distributions of Q2. Note, that by assumption, Q2 has full
support and for every a˜ ∈ A˜, it holds that the marginal of λ a˜ on I, λ a˜I , is equal to µ . Furthermore, if
mina˜∈A˜ Q(a˜)> mina∈A P(a) and mina˜,b˜∈A˜2 Q(a˜, b˜)> mina,b∈A2 P(a,b), then {Q2,ε,n,m, l} is a set of fit
parameters.
Indeed, for all a = i, j,k ∈ A, we have
min
(i, j,k)∈A
P(i, j,k) = min
(i, j,k)∈A
P( j|k, i)P(k|i)µ(i)
< 1|J|mini∈I
µ(i)
= min
a˜∈A˜
Q(a˜).
In the same way, one can show mina˜,b˜∈A˜2 Q(a˜, b˜) > mina,b∈A2 P(a,b), hence {Q2,ε,n,m, l} satisfies the
properties of a set of fit parameters.
It remains to specify the actions the players need to play in order to induce a locally typical input set
S [k∗]: The input set of nature is assumed to be
SI[k∗] =
{
xra˜ ∈ T εra˜,l(µ) : a˜ ∈ A˜
}
. (3.20)
If the agent plays a sequence of the fixed element z, i.e.,
SK [k∗] =
{
zra˜ = (z,z, . . . ,z) ∈ Kra˜ : a˜ ∈ A˜} , (3.21)
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and the agent matches nature and agent, i.e.,
SJ[k∗] =
{
yra˜ ∈ T εra˜,l(λ a˜|xra˜ ,zra˜) : a˜ ∈ A˜
}
, (3.22)
then for every (xra˜ ,yra˜ ,zra˜) ∈SI[k∗]×SJ[k∗]×SK [k∗] =S [k∗] it holds that
(xra˜ ,yra˜ ,zra˜) ∈ T εra˜,l(λ a˜),
which completes the proof.
Now, if the players are able to induce a distribution Q2 in a block k∗, then the information transmission
process can be resumed if the forecaster observes a hypothetical input set of nature in the following
block, k∗+ 1. However, we need to be precise here. We have to adapt the hypothetical input set of
nature to the fact that the players induced a distribution Q2 in block k∗ instead of the distribution P2
(compare with Definition 14). The sequences in the adapted hypothetical input set need to have slightly
different start and end indices, but the length of each sequence remains ra+m, for all a ∈ A. This stems
from the fact that A˜, the set on which Q2 is defined, is only a subset of A. Hence, for some elements
a ∈ A, the conditional subsequences αn+1a of the output sequence in block k∗ are empty. The following
Definition clarifies these statements.
Definition 19 (Q-adapted Hypothetical Input Set of Nature). Let k∗ denote a block in the play in which
the distribution Q, as introduced in Lemma 11, is induced. Furthermore, denote by {P2,ε,n,m, l} a set
of fit parameters. The Q-adapted hypothetical input set of nature, denoted by IQ[k∗+ 1] is a set of A
segments of nature’s conditional sequences {xa : a ∈ A}, with the property that a segment ιra+m[k∗+1]
has length ra+m and is locally typical w.r.t. µ:
IQ[k∗+1] =
{
ιra+m[k∗+1] ∈ T εra+m,l(µ) : a ∈ A
}
,
and for every a ∈ A,
ιra+m[k∗+1] = (xaminN(a|αk∗ ), . . . ,x
a
maxN(a|αk∗ )+ra),
where minN(a|αk∗) = N(a|αk∗−1)+ ra˜−m and N(a|αk∗) = N(a|αk∗−1)+ ra˜.
Note, that for a given element a = (i, j,k) ∈ A in the above equations for the indices, a˜ is only defined if
k = z. If k 6= z, then we set ra˜ = 0. 
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Note, that since the length of the sequences in the Q-adapted hypothetical input sets of nature hasn’t
changed, the set of action plans for the agent does also not change. However, we need to adapt the
message set of the forecaster to a block k∗ in which distribution Q is induced:
Definition 20 (The Q-adapted Message Set of the Forecaster). Let Q be a distribution as introduced in
Lemma 11 and let {Q2,ε,n,m, l} be a set of fit parameters that behaves asymptotically appropriately.
As before, denote by
{
λ a˜ :∈ ∆(A˜) : a˜ ∈ A˜} the set of conditional distributions of Q2. Furthermore,
let SI[k∗] and SK [k∗] denote the input sets of nature and of the agent in block k∗, that satisfy the
properties stated in (3.20) and in (3.21), respectively. For every a˜ ∈ A˜, set ra˜ = (n+m)Q(a˜) and denote
by (xra˜−m[k∗],zra˜−m[k∗]) the prefix of the first ra˜−m elements of (xra˜ [k∗],zra˜ [k∗])∈SI[k∗]×SK [k∗]. The
message set of the forecaster w.r.t. an element a˜ ∈ A˜, denoted by Ma˜k∗ , is then given by the m-extendable
locally conditional typical set
Ma˜k∗ = T
ε
ra˜−m,l(λ
a˜|(xra˜−m[k∗],zra˜−m[k∗]),ext(m)).
The (total) message set, Mk∗ , is given by
Mk∗ = ×
a˜∈A˜
Ma˜k∗ .

The size of the Q-adapted message set of the forecaster can now be directly deduced from Lemma 10:
Corollary 3 (The Size of the Q-adapted Message Set). Let δ (ε) be a function of ε such that δ (ε)→ 0
as ε → 0. Then, for n sufficiently large,
|Mk∗ | ≥ 2(1−δ (ε))n(log2 |J|−2ε d˜−ε),
with d˜ = |A˜| log2 |J|.
Proof. The proof follows directly from Lemma 10.
Observation 6. Observe, that log2 |J|> H(j|i,k,a), and hence |Mk∗ |> |Mk|> |AP|. Therefore, Corol-
lary 1 can be applied to a Q-adapted message set of the forecaster, i.e., there exists a surjective mapping
fk∗ : Mk∗ → AP, which we also refer to as the transmission function w.r.t. block k∗. Moreover, there still
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exists the action plan function fAP : HI→ AP, so that the information transmission process as outlined in
Definition 18 can be directly adapted to blocks k∗ and k∗+1, where distribution Q2 is induced in block
k∗. 
3.5 Proof of Theorem 2
We now have all the tools at hand to finally proof Theorem 2:
Proof of Theorem 2. Let A = (I× J×K) and let P′2 ∈ ∆(A2) be a distribution that satisfies the assump-
tions in Theorem 2. For all ε > 0, we know by Lemma 16 that there exists a distribution P2 ∈ ∆(A2) with
properties stated in Notation 11. In particular, it holds that
∥∥P2−P′2∥∥1 ≤ 2ε. (3.23)
Furthermore, let Q2 ∈ ∆(A˜2), with A˜ = I×J× z and z ∈ K, denote the distribution introduced in Lemma
11.
Fix ε > 0 and let l,n,m ∈ N be integers where n,m are chosen sufficiently large, so that the following
holds:
• nQ(a˜),mQa˜ ∈ N for all a˜ ∈ A˜
• {P2,ε,n,m, l} is a set of fit parameters that behaves asymptotically appropriately.
We show that there exist strategies (σ ,τ) that together with nature induce a sequence of random vari-
ables, (xt ,yt ,zt), t ≥ 1, s.t. the expected empirical distribution over two action triples after t = nw stages
(for w ∈ N sufficiently large), denoted by Pnw2 , is close to P2, i.e.,
‖Pnw2 −P2‖< 2ε+δ (ε), (3.24)
where δ (ε) is a function of ε with δ (ε)→ 0 as ε → 0.
Note, that Pnw is an nw-implementable distribution, and by Remark 25, Pnw is also implementable. By
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equations (3.23) and (3.24) one can then conclude that
∥∥Pnw2 −P′2∥∥≤ 4ε+δ (ε),
and since the set of implementable distributions is closed (also by Remark 25), Theorem 2 follows. We
will henceforth focus on the proof of inequality (3.24).
A pair of strategies and nature’s actions induce a play, i.e., a sequence of action triples, which we divide
into blocks of length n. We first show that there exist strategies, (σ ,τ), such that in asymptotically almost
every block k > 1, distribution P2 is induced via a locally typical input setS [k]. To be precise, P2 is not
directly induced by the strategies, but a distribution close to P2. I.e., in every block, the strategies induce
a sequence of action triples, denoted by αn+1[k] (we apply the same notation as introduced in section
3.4.1 (Strategy Outline)), with the property that
∥∥emp2(αn+1[k])−P2∥∥< δ (ε).
In the following, when stating that P2 is induced, we think of the induction in the sense of the above
inequality.
Recall that in Corollary 2 and in Lemma 11 we have already developed strategies for singled-out sce-
narios in an induced play. Observe that the above assumptions on the parameters ε,n,m, l and on the
distributions P2 and Q2 are the same as in those scenarios. Therefore, we can now assemble these strate-
gies for an entire play.
In block k = 1 we have n+ 1 stages. We assume that in the first stage of block 1, the players play
arbitrarily. Now, if nature’s input set, SI[1], is typical, i.e., satisfies property (3.10), the players can
induce the distribution Q2 as outlined in Lemma 11. If, in addition, the forecaster observes a Q-adapted
hypothetical input set of nature,IQ[2] for block 2, then the players can induce P2 in block 2 (this follows
directly from Observation 6 and from Corollary 2).
Whenever the players are able to induce a distribution P2 in a block k ≥ 2 and if the forecaster observes
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a hypothetical input set I [k+1] at the beginning of block k, they are able to induce P2 in block k+1.
Again, this is outlined in Corollary 2.
If, in block k = 1, nature’s input set, SI[1], is not typical, i.e., does not satisfy property (3.10), then we
consider the first block as a lost block and the forecaster cannot transmit any information about future
states of nature. If this happens, the agent still plays a fixed element z and the forecaster plays a random
sequence. In this case, the strategies of the players for block 2 are the same as in block 1: if nature’s
input set,SI[2], satisfies property (3.10), the players can induce Q2 in block 2, etc.
Finally, if in a block k ≥ 1 the players have either induced Q2 or P2 and the forecaster is not able to
observe a (Q-adapted) hypothetical input set of nature for the upcoming block k+1, then P2 cannot be
induced in block k+ 1 and no information can be transmitted from the forecaster to the agent. Hence,
block k+1 is a lost block. Also, observe that in this case no information is sent to the agent in block k,
i.e., the forecaster does not send a message to the agent (nevertheless, the forecaster’s input setSJ[k] still
has property (3.12)). In the lost block k+1, the agent again plays a fixed sequence z and the forecaster
plays a random sequence. In block k+ 2 after the lost block k+ 1, the strategies of the players are the
same as in block 1, i.e., they start anew.
Denote by (xt ,yt ,zt), 1≤ t ≤ n ·w, w ∈N, a sequence of random triples induced by the strategies (σ ,τ)
and by nature’s actions. Furthermore, denote by (x[k],y[k],z[k]) =α [k] the kth block of n random triples,
with 1 ≤ k ≤ w. Now, recall, that we call a block k > 1 a lost block, if the players cannot induce P2.
In particular, in a lost block it holds that ‖emp2(α [k])−P2‖> δ (ε), where δ (ε) is a function of ε with
δ (ε)→ 0 as ε → 0. Denote by LB the event of such a lost block. In a lost block, at least one of nature’s
conditional sequences is not locally typical w.r.t. µ . Now, recall, that it depends on the observation of
the (possibly Q-adapted) hypothetical input set of nature in block k, whether that block is lost or not.
More precisely, if, for every a ∈ A, the sequences in the hypothetical input set are locally typical w.r.t.
µ , block k is not lost. Now, by Lemma 18, it holds that for every a ∈ A, and for every segment of ra+m
elements in nature’s (random) conditional sequence (note, that ra+m is the length of a sequence in the
hypothetical input set),
Pr(xra+m ∈ T εra+m,l(µ))→ 1 as n→ ∞.
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It directly follows that for the complement of LB, which we call a good block, or GB,
PR(GB) = PR(‖emp2(α [k])−P2‖ ≤ δ (ε))→ 1 as n→ ∞.
Therefore, it is indeed the case that in asymptotically almost every block k > 1 the strategies induce a
good block.
We conclude the proof by showing that the expected empirical distribution over pairs of the random
sequence (xt ,yt ,zt), denoted by Pnw2 , is close to P2, i.e., we prove
‖Pnw2 −P2‖< δ (ε)+2ε. (3.25)
First, by the law of total expectation, and for every k > 1, we have
E[emp2(α [k])] = E[emp2(α [k])|GB]PR(GB)+E[emp2(α [k])|LB]PR(LB),
therefore, for n sufficiently large,
‖E[emp2(α [k])]−P2‖< ‖E[emp2(α [k])|GB]−P2‖+ ε
< δ (ε)+ ε.
It follows, that if w is sufficiently large,
‖Pnw2 −P2‖= ‖E[emp2(xt ,yt ,zt)]−P2‖
=
1
w
∥∥∥∥∥E
[
w
∑
k=1
emp2(α [k])
]
−wP2
∥∥∥∥∥
=
1
w
∥∥∥∥∥ w∑k=1E [emp2(α [k])]−wP2
∥∥∥∥∥
≤ 1
w
‖E [emp2(α [1])]−P2‖+ 1w
w
∑
k=2
‖E[emp2(α [k])]−P2‖
≤ δ (ε)+2ε,
which completes the proof.
75
Part II
Model 2
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Chapter 1
The Properties of Model 2
We now introduce a second model that is more closely related to the model in [6]. The reader will
notice that other than in the first model, the forecaster’s actions do not influence the players’ payoff. The
forecaster’s only task is to submit her knowledge about future states of nature. The structure of the payoff
function hence reduces the complexity of the proofs of the main theorems to an extent. Nevertheless, we
cannot adapt the methods from [6] to this model one to one. The key idea here is to introduce another
concept, called block distributions, that prove to be useful in applying the results from [6], especially in
the proof of the second main theorem.
1.1 The Description of the Model
Let us first present the features of the new model. As before, we denote the action sets of nature, fore-
caster and agent by I, J and K respectively. We will consider a repeated game, and in each stage t ≥ 1,
the actions played by nature, forecaster and agent are denoted by xt ∈ I, yt ∈ J and zt ∈ K, respectively.
Just like in Model 2, the team, that again consists of the forecaster and the agent, is assigned a payoff
per stage. This time, it does not depend on the forecaster’s actions, but only on agent’s and on nature’s
actions in the current stage, as well as on the agent’s actions in the previous stage. Hence, the stage-
payoff function is given as follows:
gt : K× I×K→ R.
The assumptions on the knowledge of the players are similar to the model in [6]. At the beginning of
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a repeated game, the forecaster can observe all future states of nature. She can also observe the past
play during the game. The agent, on the other hand, does not have any knowledge at the beginning of
the game and in every stage t > 1, she can only observe the past play. More precisely, the forecaster’s
strategy, denoted by σ = (σt)t , is expressed in dependence of her observation of nature’s sequence of
actions, and of her observation of the past play. That is, in every stage t > 1,
σt : IN× Jt−1×Kt−1→ J
describes the action of the forecaster, yt , in stage t. The agent’s strategy, given by τ = (τt)t , is expressed
in dependence of the past play, i.e., for every stage t > 1,
τt : It−1× Jt−1×Kt−1→ K
describes the action of the agent, zt in stage t.
The assumptions on nature are also identical to the model in [6]: at the beginning of the play, nature
draws a realisation x = x1,x2, . . . ,∈ IN of an i.i.d. sequence i = i1, i2, . . . with law µ .
A pair of strategies (σ ,τ) together with µ induce a sequence of random action triples a1,a2, . . . with
at = (it , jt ,kt), for t ≥ 1. The corresponding induced probability distribution over (I×J×K)N is denoted
by Qµ,σ ,τ .
1.2 Implementable Distributions
In this section, we introduce 2 types of implementable distributions that will be of interest in the up-
coming sections. We will first denote two important distribution that can be deduced from an induced
probability distribution Qµ,σ ,τ .
Notation 15. Denote by Q(t−1,t)K×(I×K) the marginal distribution of Qµ,σ ,τ on K×(I×K) in stages ((t−1), t).
The average distribution up to stage T ≥ 1 of these distributions is written as
QTK×(I×K) =
1
T
T
∑
t=2
Q(t−1,t)K×(I×K),
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and we refer to this distribution as the expected empirical 2-stage distribution. Let us now divide the
stages into consecutive blocks l = 1,2, . . ., each of size T (i.e., we have T stages in each block). Denote
by Q(l;T )µ,σ ,τ the marginal of Qµ,σ ,τ on block l and denote by
Q¯(r;T )µ,σ ,τ = 1r
r
∑
l=1
Q(l;T )µ,σ ,τ
the average of these marginal distributions up to block r. We call this distribution the expected empirical
T -block distribution. 
Given the above notation, we can now introduce two types of implementable distributions:
Definition 21. A distribution P ∈ ∆(K× (I×K)) is implementable, if there exists a pair of strategies
(σ ,τ), s.t. QTK×(I×K) → P, for T → ∞. P is called T - implementable, if QTK×(I×K) = P. The set of
this type of implementable (respectively, T -implementable) distributions is denoted byP (respectively,
P(T )). 
Definition 22. A distribution Q ∈ ∆(IT × JT ×KT ) is implementable, if there exists a pair of strategies
(σ ,τ), s.t. Q¯(r;T )µ,σ ,τ → Q as r→ ∞. We call Q r- implementable if Q¯(r;T )µ,σ ,τ = Q. The set of this type of
implementable (respectively, r-implementable) distributions is denoted byQ (respectively,Q(r)). 
Below, we state properties of the setsP andP(t) which directly follow from Remark 1 and Remark 2
in [6]:
Remark 20. [Properties of Sets of Implemebtable Distributions]
• The set of implementable distributionP as denoted in Definition 21 is closed.
• The set of T -implementable distributions,P(T ), is contained inP .

1.3 The Information Constraint
Let P be a distribution over K× (I×K), and denote by (k′, i,k) a triple of random variables distributed
according to P. We say that P fulfills the information constraint, if
log |J| ≥ H(k|k′)−H(k|k′, i).
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Equivalently, one can write
log |J| ≥ H(i|k′)−H(i|k,k′).
We can interpret the left-hand side as the information sent from the forecaster to the agent and the right-
hand side as the information used by the agent. The latter is the reduction of uncertainty that k gives
on the conditional random variables i|k′. Note, that the right-hand side is also known as the conditional
mutual information of the random variabes (k, i,k′).
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Chapter 2
Results
We will prove two major results. In the first one, the information constraint defines the set of imple-
mentable distributions:
Theorem 4. Let P ∈ ∆(K × (I×K)) be an implementable distribution with (k′, i,k) ∼ P and i ∼ µ .
Then, P fulfills the information constraint
log |J| ≥ H(i|k′)−H(i|k,k′).
In the second result, we characterise distributions P ∈ ∆(K× (I×K)) that are implementable:
Theorem 5. Let P ∈ ∆(K× (I×K)) be a distribution with full support and with marginal distribution
PI = µ on I and with unique marginal distribution PK on K. Denote by (k′, i,k) a random triple with
(k′, i,k)∼P and let i be independent of k′. If P fulfills the the information constraint, P is implementable.
Remark 21. The assumption in 5 that i is independent of k′ is a necessary technical assumption as we
will see later on in the proof of the Theorem. It reduces the information constraint to
log |J| ≥ H(i)−H(i|k).
Note, that assuming J to be larger in size than I would directly imply this information constraint (since
then log |J| ≥ log |I| ≥ H(i)). The independence assumption, however, does not immediately lead to
the information constraint to be fulfilled (at least not without further assumptions). Hence, however
restrictive this independence assumption may appear regarding the set of distributions we want to de-
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scribe as implementable, it does not restrict the sizes of the action sets and hence does not imply a trivial
(immediate) fulfilment of the information constraint. 
2.1 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. First, we prove the Theorem for every T -implementable distribution P ∈ ∆(K× (I×K)):
By Lemma 1 in [6] the function f : ∆(K× (I×K))→ R, f (Q) = HQ(i|k,k′) is concave. Recall, that
every T -implementable distribution P ∈ ∆(K × (I ×K)) can be expressed as the expected empirical
distribution of 2-step triples (kt−1, it ,kt) in an induced game up to stage T ≥ 1, P = 1T ∑Tt=1 Qt−1,tK×(I×K).
Therefore, we get
HP(i|k′,k)≥ 1T
T
∑
t=1
HQt−1,tK×(I×K)
(i|k′,k).
Furthermore,
T
∑
t=1
HQt−1,tK×(I×K)
(i|k′,k) =
T
∑
t=1
H(it |kt ,kt−1)
=
T
∑
t=1
H(it ,kt |kt ,kt−1)
≥
T
∑
t=1
H(it ,kt |i1, . . . , it−1, j1, . . . jT ,k1, . . . ,kt−1,kt) (2.1)
=
T
∑
t=1
H(it ,kt |i1, . . . , it−1, j1, . . . , jT ,k1, . . . ,kt−1) (2.2)
= H(i1, . . . , iT ,k1, . . . ,kT |j1, . . . , jT )
= H(i1, j1,k1, . . . , iT , jT ,kT )−H(j1, . . . , jT )
≥ H(i1, . . . , iT )−T log |J|
= T (H(i)− log |J|),
where inequality (2.1) follows from the monotonicity property of the entropy (conditioning reduces en-
tropy) and equality (2.2) is due to the fact that kt is a deterministic function of the past. In the remaining
rearrangements the chain rule is applied, as well as the property of maximum entropy. Finally, note that
the last equality results from the assumption that nature’s sequence i1, . . . , iT is i.i.d.
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Hence, we have
T HP(i|k′,k)≥ T (H(i)− log |J|) (2.3)
≥ T (HP(i|k′)− log |J|). (2.4)
We have thus shown that every T -implementable distribution fulfills the information constraint.
Now, recall that every implementable distribution P′ ∈P is the limiting distribution of a T -implementable
distribution. Since the mappings P 7→ HP(i|k,k′), and P 7→ HP(i|k′) are uniformly continuous, we can
conclude that the Information Constraint must also hold for all implementable distributions.
2.2 Proof of Theorem 5
The proof consists of several steps. The rough outline is as follows. We first define a so-called block
distribution Q˜ of a sequence of random variables with transition probabilities derived from P. We can
then use the results in [6] to show that Q˜ is implementable if P (as given in Theorem 5) satisfies the
information constraint. In a final step we will then show that the strategies that implement Q˜ also
implement P.
Notation 16. Let P denote a distribution over K× (I×K) with identical properties as in Theorem 5.
Furthermore, for every (z′,x,z) ∈ K× (I×K), we write
P(k′, i,k = z′,x,z) = P(z′,x,z),
P(i,k = x,z) = PI×K(x,z),
P(k = z) = PK(z),
P(i = x) = µ(x), and
P(i,k = x,z|k′ = z′) = P(x,z|z′) = P(z
′,x,z)
PK(z′)
.

We will now define a markov chain with a transition matrix derived from P:
Definition 23. Denote by ((it ,kt); t ∈ N) a time-homogeneous markov chain with state space I×K,
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initial distribution PI×K and with the following property: for every n ≥ 1 and for every sequence
((x1,z1), . . . ,(xn−2,zn−2),(x′,z′),(x,z)) ∈ (I×K)n, let
P(in,kn = x,z|(i1,k1 = x1,z1), . . . ,(in−2,kn−2 = xn−2,zn−2),(in−1,kn−1 = x′,z′))
= P(in,kn = x,z|in−1,kn−1 = x′,z′)
= P(in,kn = x,z|kn−1 = z′)
= P(x,z|z′)
The transition matrix of this markov chain is given by
Pt : (I×K)× (I×K)→ [0,1],
with Pt(x′,z′;x,z) = P(x,z|z′), ∀x′,∈ I.

Properties of the Markov Chain
Proposition 1. The markov chain ((it ,kt); t ∈ N) with transition matrix Pt is stationary with stationary
distribution PI×K .
Proof. First, since P has full support, the transition matrix Pt has full support and thus the markov chain
has a unique stationary distribution. Further, consider PI×K as a stochastic row vector of length |I×K|.
We show
PI×KPt = PI×K .
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For every (x,z) ∈ I×K, we have
∑
(i,k)∈I×K
PI×K(i,k)Pt(i,k;x,z) = ∑
(i,k)∈I×K
PI×K(i,k)P(x,z|k)
= ∑
k∈K
P(x,z|k)∑
i∈I
PI×K(i,k)
= ∑
k∈K
P(x,z|k)PK(k)
= ∑
k∈K
P(k,x,z)
= PI×K(x,z)
Proposition 2. For n ∈N+ let in = i1, . . . , in be a sequence of random variables drawn from the markov
chain ((it ,kt); t ∈ N) with transition matrix Pt . Then, in is an i.i.d. sequence with it ∼ µ , t ∈ (1, . . . ,n).
Proof. Let (x1, . . . ,xn)∈ In. To simplify the notation, we replace P(i1 = x1, . . . , in = xn) by P(x1, . . . ,xn).
We will show P(x1, . . . ,xn) =∏nt=1 µ(xt).
For t ∈ (1, . . . ,n) and for any integer j, 1≤ j < t, we have
P(xt |xt−1, . . . ,xt− j) = ∑
z′∈K
P(xt |xt−1, . . . ,xt− j,kt−1 = z′)P(kt−1 = z′|xt−1, . . . ,xt− j)
= ∑
z′∈K
P(xt |z′)P(kt−1 = z′|xt−1, . . . ,xt− j)
= ∑
z′∈K
P(xt)P(kt−1 = z′|xt−1, . . . ,xt− j)
= P(xt) = µ(xt),
where the third equality is due to the fact that i is independent of k′. Hence,
P(x1, . . . ,xn) = P(x1)
n
∏
t=2
P(xt |xt−1, . . . ,x1)
=
n
∏
t=1
P(xt)
=
n
∏
t=1
µ(xt).
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Information Constraint of a block distribution Q˜
We now define a block distribution Q˜ ∈ ∆(IT × JT ×KT ) that is derived from the above markov chain:
Definition 24. Let T be a fixed integer and let (iT ,kT ) = (i1,k1, . . . , iT ,kT ) be a sequence of random
variables drawn from the markov chain ((it ,kt); t ∈ N) with transition matrix Pt . Set (iT ,kT ) ∼ P˜ ∈
∆(IT ×KT ). Furthermore, let jT = (j1, . . . , jT ) be an i.i.d. sequence with jt ∼ UJ , where UJ denotes the
uniform distribution over J. We write jT ∼U⊗TJ and we let jT to be independent of iT and kT . The block
distribution Q˜ ∈ ∆(IT × JT ×KT ) derived from the markov chain ((it ,kt); t ∈ N) is then defined as the
product distribution of P˜ and U⊗TJ , i.e.
Q˜ = P˜×U⊗TJ .

Remark 22. As an immediate consequence from Proposition 2, the block distribution Q˜ defined above
has the marginal distribution Q˜I = µ⊗T on IT . 
The following result introduces the information constraint on block distributions and can be directly
inferred from [6].
Lemma 12. For every T ∈ N, let Q denote a distribution over IT × JT ×KT , with marginal QI = µ⊗T
on IT . If Q satisfies the following inequality
HQ(iT , jT |kT )≥ HQ(iT ), (2.5)
then Q is implementable. We will refer to inequality 2.5 as the GHN- information constraint, or simply
the GHN IC.
The next Lemma establishes the link between the information constraint defined in this paper and the
GHN IC:
Lemma 13. Let Q˜ ∈ ∆(IT × JT ×KT ) be defined as in Definition 24. If P satisfies the information
constraint
log |J| ≥ H(k|k′)−H(k|k′, i),
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then Q˜ satisfies the GHN IC
HQ˜(i
T , jT |kT )≥ HQ˜(iT ).
Proof. Since jT is assumed to be independent of iT and kT , we have
HQ˜(i
T , jT |kT ) = HQ˜(iT |jT ,kT )+HQ˜(jT |kT )
= HQ˜(i
T |kT )+T H(UJ).
Now,
HQ˜(i
T |kT ) = HP˜(iT |kT ) = HP˜(iT ,kT )−HP˜(kT )
=
T
∑
t=1
HP˜(it ,kt |it−1,kt−1, . . . , i1,k1)−
T
∑
t=1
HP˜(kt |kt−1, . . . ,k1)
=
T
∑
t=1
HP˜(it ,kt |it−1,kt−1)−
T
∑
t=1
HP˜(kt |kt−1)
=
T
∑
t=1
HP(it ,kt |kt−1)−
T
∑
t=1
HP(kt |kt−1)
= T (HP(i,k|k′)−HP(k|k′))
= T (HP(i|k,k′)+HP(k|k′)−HP(k|k′))
= T HP(i|k).
Furthermore, note, that since we assumed i to be independent of k′, the information constraint of P
reduces to
log |J| ≥ HP(i)−HP(i|k).
Also, note that H(UJ) = log |J|, hence
T H(UJ)≥ T (HP(i)−HP(i|k)).
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Therefore, it follows that
HQ˜(i
T |kT )+T H(UJ)≥ T HP(i|k′)+T (HP(i)−HP(i|k))
≥ T HP(i)
= HQ˜(i
T ),
where the last equality follows due to Proposition 2.
Lemma 12 and Lemma 13 can be combined into the following Corollary:
Corollary 4. Let Q˜ be the distribution as constructed in Definition (24). If P satisfies the information
constraint
log |J| ≥ H(k|k′)−H(k|k′, i),
then Q˜ is implementable.
Even though the Corollary follows immediately from Lemma 12 and from Lemma 13, we nevertheless
sketch the proof of this Corollary (which is not intended to be exhaustive). The approach is exactly the
same as in [6], but since Q˜ is a block distribution, we first have to adjust some of the applied notation
and concepts. We then provide an outline of the construction of the strategies (σ ,τ) that implement Q˜.
Since we will (later) deduce that the strategies that implement Q˜ also implement P, many of the concepts
and notations that we establish in the following will be applied in the proof of the implementation of P.
Let us first introduce empirical T -block distributions:
Definition 25 (Empirical T-Block Distribution). Let A be a finite set and let n,T ∈ N, such that n is a
multiple of T , i.e., we write n = pT , for p > 0. Let an = a1,a2, . . . ,an denote a sequence in An, which
can also be written as blocks of length T :
an = a1,a2, . . . ,ap with al = a(l−1)T+1, . . . ,alT , l ∈ (1, . . . , p) .
Given a (block-) element αT ∈ AT , we define the block-wise relative frequency of αT in a sequence an
as follows:
empT (an)[αT ] = 1p
∣∣∣{l ≥ 1 : al = αT}∣∣∣ .
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We call empT (an) the empirical T-block distribution of an. 
Remark 23. Note, that by block-wise relative frequency of a block-element αT ∈ AT in an we mean the
relative number of times the block-element αT appears in the fixed blocks a1,a2, . . . ,ap. This definition
needs to be distinguished from the relative frequency of a block-element in an, which accounts for
the relative number of appearances of a block-element throughout the whole sequence an, irrespective
of fixed blocks. The block-wise empirical frequency can hence be treated as the block-version of the
relative frequency of a single element α ∈ A in a given sequence an. 
Notation 17. [Actions played in Long Blocks] For given integers r,m,T ∈ N with m = rT , we call a
block of length m that consists of r blocks of T stages a long block. The sequences played by nature,
forecaster and agent in a long block l are denoted by x[l],y[l] and z[l] respectively. For every long block
l, the sequence in l can either be given as a sequence of (stage) action triples, denoted by
(x[l],y[l],z[l]) = (x1[l],y1[l],z1[l], . . . ,xm[l],ym[l],zm[l]),
with (xt [l],yt [l],zt [l]) ∈ I× J×K, ∀t ∈ (1, . . . ,m), or as a sequence of r (small) blocks of action triples
of length T , denoted by
(x[l],y[l],z[l]) = (xT1 [l],y
T
1 [l],z
T
1 [l], . . . ,x
T
r [l],y
T
r [l],z
T
r [l]),
with (xT1 [l],y
T
1 [l],z
T
1 [l]) ∈ XT ×Y T ×ZT , ∀b ∈ (1, . . . ,r). 
Definition (Stage-and Block-Hamming Distance with Empirical T -Block Distributions). Let m denote
the length of a long block as in Notation 17, i.e., set m = rT . Let Q˜I ∈ ∆(In) and let xm ∈ In and
x˜m ∈ T Tm (Q˜I) 6= /0. Recall that both sequences can be written as sequences of blocks of length T as in
Definition 25. We define the block hamming distance of (xm, x˜m) as the number of blocks 1≤ b≤ r with
xTb 6= x˜Tb , where xTb (x˜Tb ) denotes block b in xm (x˜m). The block hamming distance of (xm, x˜m) needs to
be distinguished from the usual (stage-) hamming distance of (xm, x˜m), which is given by the number of
stages 1≤ t ≤ rT with xmt 6= x˜mt . 
We are now able to provide an outline of the construction of strategies (σ ,τ) that implement a distribu-
tion Q˜ as stated in Corollary 4:
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Implementing Q˜
We divide the stages of the game into long blocks of length m with m = rT as in Notation 17, s.t. every
long block consists of r blocks of T stages. W.l.o.g., we assume that T Tm (Q˜) 6= /0.
The Strategies: The strategies (σ ,τ) are based on the following mechanism. Before the start of each
long block l > 0, the forecaster observes the sequence played by nature in the next long block l + 1,
x[l+1]. She then chooses a sequence x˜[l+1]∈ T Tm (Q˜I) (note that since T Tm (Q˜) 6= /0, we have T Tm (Q˜I) 6= /0)
in such a way, so that it minimises the block- hamming distance to x[l+1], as well as the (stage-) ham-
ming distance to x[l+1] (the minimization of the (stage-) hamming distance is not a requirement for the
implementation of Q˜, however, this additional assumption simplifies the proof of the implementation of
P). Since Q˜ satisfies the GHN IC, in each block l ≥ 1, the forecaster is able to play a sequence y[l], that
entails a message to the agent about what to play in the subsequent long block [l+1]. In block l+1 the
forecaster and agent are then able to play sequences that together with the slightly changed sequence of
nature, x˜[l+1], induce Q˜, i.e., (x˜[l],y[l],z[l]) ∈ T Tm (Q˜), ∀l > 1.
The Expected Empirical Distribution: Let us now consider a long game with n long blocks, i.e., let
N = nrT denote the length of the long game. Following the proof of Theorem 2 in [6], the strategies
(σ ,τ) implement a sequence of random variables (xt ,yt ,zt)t , where (xt)t is the i.i.d. sequence of nature
with xt ∼ µ , as well as the sequence (x˜t ,yt ,zt)t , for 1≤ t ≤ N (note, that a realization of (x˜t)t in a long
block is an element in T Tm (µ⊗T ). We can also denote these sequences as sequences of block sequences,
i.e.,
(xt ,yt ,zt)t = (x
T
b ,y
T
b ,z
T
b )b, (2.6)
and
(x˜t ,yt ,zt)t = (x˜
T
b ,y
T
b ,z
T
b )b, (2.7)
for 1 ≤ b ≤ n. Observe, that by construction, every realization of (x˜Tb ,yTb ,zTb )b has the property that in
every long block after the first, it is T-block typical w.r.t. Q˜. Hence, the expected empirical distribution
of a long block in (x˜Tb ,y
T
b ,z
T
b )b is Q˜:
E[empT (x˜[l],y[l],z[l])] = Q˜ ∀l > 1.
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It will be useful to observe the following (equivalent) notation. If (x˜Tb ,y
T
b ,z
T
b )∼ QTb , we have
1
r
r
∑
b=1
QTb = Q˜. (2.8)
To finalise the sketch of the proof of Corollary 4, one can follow the exact same steps as in the proof of
Theorem 2 in [6], to come to the conclusion that the strategies (σ ,τ) implement Q˜.
Observe, that we assumed that T Tm (Q˜) 6= /0. In the following remark, one can see that this assumptions is
not restrictive, since even if T Tm (Q˜) = /0, we can approximate Q˜ by a distribution Q¯, such that T
T
m (Q¯) 6= /0.
Remark 24. If T Tm (Q˜) = /0, then by Lemma 4 in [6], it holds that for all ε > 0 there exists a distribution
Q¯ ∈ ∆(IT × JT ×KT ), s.t. T Tm (Q˜) 6= /0 with the following properties:
• ∥∥Q¯− Q˜∥∥< 7ε
• ∥∥Q¯I−µ⊗T∥∥< 7ε
• ∥∥P¯− P˜∥∥< 7ε
• ∥∥P¯t−1;t −P∥∥< 7ε , ∀t ∈ (1, . . . ,T −1)
and
• HQ¯(iT , jT |kT )−HQ¯(iT )≥ ε ,
where P¯ denotes the marginal of Q¯ on IT ×KT and P¯t−1;t denotes the marginal of P¯ on (K× (I×K)) at
stages (t−1; t). 
Implementation of P
Let us quickly recap our approach so far. We started off with a distribution P ∈ ∆(K× (I×K)) that
satisfies the properties in Theorem 5. In the previous paragraphs we constructed a (block-) distribution
Q˜ ∈ ∆(IT × JT ×KT ) which we derived from P in Definition 24 and we were able to show that Q˜ is
implementable if P satisfies the information constraint. In the following, we will show that the strategies
that implement Q˜ in Corollary 4 also implement P. An important step in this proof is the next Theorem.
Theorem 6. Fix ε > 0. Let P ∈ ∆(K× (I×K)) be a distribution that satisfies the properties in Theorem
5. Let (σ ,τ) be the strategies that implement Q˜ from Definition 24 and set n,r, t ∈ N with N = nrT .
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Furthermore, let (xt ,yt ,zt)t , 1 ≤ t ≤ N denote the sequence of random actions induced by (σ ,τ) and
by nature’s i.i.d. sequence (xt)t . If PNµ,σ ,τ denotes the expected empirical 2-stage distribution over
(K× (I×K)) of (xt ,yt ,zt)t , then PNµ,σ ,τ is close to P in the L1-norm i.e.,
∥∥PNµ,σ ,τ −P∥∥< 19ε.
We will split the proof of Theorem 6 into several Lemmas. First, consider the following.
Lemma 14. Let P˜mµ,σ ,τ denote the expected empirical 2-stage distribution over (K× (I×K)) in a long
block l > 1 of length m = rT of the sequence (x˜t ,yt ,zt)t , which is induced by the strategies (σ ,τ) of the
players that implement Q˜. Then,
P˜mµ,σ ,τ → P as T → ∞.
Proof. Fix a long block l > 1, and for 1≤ t ≤m= rT denote by Pt−1;t ∈ ∆(K× (I×K)) the distribution
of the random triple (zt−1, x˜t ,zt). Furthermore, for a (small) block b in l with 1≤ b≤ r denote by Pt−1;tb
the distribution of the random 2-stage triple (zt−1b , x˜
t
b,z
t
b), where 1 ≤ t ≤ T . (the reader should observe
that these distributions are not different from each other, they just differ w.r.t. the notation of a random
triple in a (small) block, b, or in a long block. Furthermore, recall that the marginal of Q˜ on IT ×KT
is given by P˜, and by Definition 24, the marginal of P˜ on K× (I×K) at stages (t− 1, t) is P for every
t ∈ (2, . . . ,T ). Let P˜t−1;t denote the marginal of P˜ on (K× (I×K)) at stages (t−1; t).
Now, if T Tm (Q˜) 6= /0, then by equation (2.8), it holds that
1
r
r
∑
b=1
Pt−1;tb = P˜
t−1;t = P. (2.9)
and
P˜rTµ,σ ,τ =
1
rT
rT
∑
t=2
Pt−1;t
= 1rT
(
T−1
∑
t=2
Pt−1;t +
2T−1
∑
t=T+1
Pt−1;t + . . .+
rT−1
∑
t=(r−1)T+1
Pt−1;t +
r
∑
b=1
PT−1;Tb
)
= 1rT
(
T−1
∑
t=2
Pt−1;t1 +
T−1
∑
t=2
Pt−1;t2 + . . .+
T−1
∑
t=2
Pt−1;tr +
r
∑
b=1
PT ;T−1b
)
= 1rT
(
T−1
∑
t=2
r
∑
b=1
Pt−1;tb +
r
∑
b=1
PT−1;Tb
)
.
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Therefore, by substituting equation (2.9) into the last equation above, we can conclude that
P˜rTµ,σ ,τ =
1
rT
(
(T −2)rP+
r
∑
b=1
PT−1;Tb
)
→ P for T → ∞.
The computation of P˜rTµ,σ ,τ changes slightly if T
T
m (Q˜) = /0, but the result is not affected. By Remark 24,
we know that for all ε > 0 there exists a distribution Q¯ ∈ ∆(IT × JT ×KT ) with T Tm (Q¯) 6= /0 that is close
to Q˜ and has marginal P¯ on IT ×KT . Hence, the result in (2.8) changes to
1
r
r
∑
b=1
QTb = Q¯,
and we have to replace equation (2.9) by
1
r
r
∑
b=1
Pt−1;tb = P¯
t−1;t ,
where P¯t−1;t denotes the marginal of P¯ on stages (t−1, t). Then, since ∥∥P¯t−1;t −P∥∥< 7ε , ∀t ∈ (2, . . . ,T ),
we can deduce that
1
rT
T−1
∑
t=2
P¯t−1;t → P as T → ∞.
So far, we have shown that the expected empirical distribution over triples (zt−1, x˜t ,zt) in (x˜t ,yt ,zt)t in
every long block l after the first is arbitrarily close to P. One can summarise the result in the following
Corollary:
Corollary 5. For N = nrT , if P˜Nµ,σ ,τ denotes the expected empirical 2-stage distribution over (K× (I×
K)) of the sequence (x˜t ,yt ,zt)t for 1≤ t ≤ N, then, assuming T large enough,
∥∥P˜Nµ,σ ,τ −P∥∥< ε.
In the final Lemma, we connect the expected empirical 2-stage distribution over (K× (I×K)) of the
sequence (x˜t ,yt ,zt)t with the expected empirical 2-stage distribution over (K× (I×K)) of the sequence
(xt ,yt ,zt)t :
Lemma 15. Fix ε > 0. Let N = rnT and let r > |I|
2
ε3 . Let P
N
µ,σ ,τ be given as in Theorem 6 and let P˜
N
µ,σ ,τ
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be given as in Lemma 14. Then, ∥∥P˜Nµ,σ ,τ −PNµ,σ ,τ∥∥< 18ε.
Proof. The proof of this Lemma can be deduced from the proof of Theorem 2 and from Corollary 2,
both in [6]. The ideas from [6] only need to be adapted to 2− stage empirical distributions. In particular,
we make use of the following notation.
For (xn,ym) ∈ (I×K)m, we write empK×(I×K)2 (xn,yn) to denote the following 2- stage empirical distri-
bution:
emp2(xn,yn)[k′, i,k] = 1n−1 N(k
′, i,k|xn,yn), ∀(k′, i,k) ∈ K× (I×K).
Now, in a first step, we show that for every large block l > 0:
∥∥∥empK×(I×K)2 (x˜[l],z[l])− empK×(I×K)2 (x[l],z[l])∥∥∥≤ 2rT rT∑
t=1
1x˜t [l]6=xt [l].
To simplify the notation, we write (x˜,z) and (x,z) instead of (x˜[l],z[l]) and (x[l],z[l]), with (x˜,z),(x,z) ∈
(I×K)rT . Furthermore, let B∗ ⊂ K× (I×K), s.t. emp2(x˜,z)[k′, i,k]> emp2(x,z)[k′, i,k], ∀(k′, i,k) ∈ B∗,
and let B∗I denote the respective subset on I. Then,
∥∥∥empK×(I×K)2 (x˜[l],z[l])− empK×(I×K)2 (x[l],z[l])∥∥∥= ∑
(k′,i,k)
∈K×(I×K)
∣∣emp2(x˜,z)[k′, i,k]− emp2(x,z)[k′, i,k]∣∣
≤ 2 ∑
(k′,i,k)∈B∗
∣∣emp2(x˜,z)[k′, i,k]− emp2(x,z)[k′, i,k]∣∣
≤ 2rT ∑
i∈B∗I
(|{t ≥ 1 : x˜ = i}|− |{t ≥ 1 : xt = i}|)
= 2rT
rT
∑
t=1
1x˜t 6=xt
Now, applying Corollary 2 from [6], we have
P(
rT
∑
t=1
1x˜t [l]6=xt [l] ≥ 8rTε)≤
|I|2
ε2rT
,
and hence, due to the choice of r, P(∑rTt=11x˜t [l]6=xt [l] ≥ 8rTε) ≤ ε . With this, we can then conclude that
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for 1≤ t ≤ N,
∥∥P˜Nµ,σ ,τ −PNµ,σ ,τ∥∥= ∥∥∥E[empK×(I×K)2 (x˜t ,zt)t ]−E[empK×(I×K)2 (xt ,zt)t ]∥∥∥
≤ 2
rT
E
rT
∑
t=1
1x˜t 6=xt
=
2
rT
rT
∑
j=1
P(
rT
∑
t=1
1x˜t 6=xt ≥ j)
≤ 2
rT
(8εrT + εrT )
= 18ε,
where we use the fact that the sum ∑rTt=11x˜t 6=xt is minimised.
One can now immediately observe that Theorem 6 follows from the results in Corollary 5 and in Lemma
15 by applying the triangle inequality.
Proof of Theorem 5
Let us now conclude this section with the proof of Theorem 5, which is a Corollary of Theorem 6.
Proof of Theorem 5. Let P ∈ (K× (I×K)) denote a distribution that satisfies the properties in Theorem
5. By Theorem 6, we know that there exist strategies (σ ,τ) that N-implement a distribution PNµ,σ ,τ
(the expected empirical 2-stage distribution over (K× (I×K))), where PNµ,σ ,τ is close to P in the L1-
norm. The result now follows, since by Remark 20, the set of implementable distributions is closed and
contains the set of N-implementable distributions.
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Appendix A
Complementary Results for Chapter 1 in
Part 1
Remark 25. Every distribution Q ∈Q(t) is implementable, i.e.,Q(t) is contained inQ. 
Proof. Let Q be a t-implementable distribution, i.e., following Notation 4, there exist strategies (σ ,τ),
s.t.
Q = 1t−1
t−1
∑
t ′=1
Pt
′:2
U,σ ,τ .
We will show that there are strategies (σ ′,τ ′), s.t.
1
t−1
t−1
∑
t ′=1
Pt
′:2
U,σ ′,τ ′ → Q as t→ ∞.
Consider the following game. Assume that the first t stages are induced by the strategy pair (σ ,τ), so
that in those first t stages Q is implemented. After the first t stages we repeat the same strategy, i.e., we
induce the stages t +1, t +2, . . . ,2t with the same strategy pair, (σ ,τ). We repeat this process n times,
i.e., we construct blocks of t stages, such that in each block the random sequences of action triples are
induced by the strategy pair (σ ,τ). Hence, if we consider each block seperately, we t-implement distri-
bution Q in each such block.
Now, denote by (σ ′,τ ′) the strategy pair that implements the first tn stages of the game we just described.
We can think of (σ ′,τ ′) as the n-times repeated strategy pair (σ ,τ). The average distribution, Q′, which
is implemented after the first tn stages of the game and which is induced by (σ ′,τ ′) can be written as
96
follows:
Q′ = 1nt−1
nt
∑
t ′=1
Pt
′:2
U,σ ′,τ ′ . (A.1)
The sum in the above equation can be rewritten as follows:
nt
∑
t ′=1
Pt
′:2
U,σ ′,τ ′ =
t−1
∑
t ′=1
Pt
′:2
U,σ ,τ +
2t−1
∑
t ′=1
Pt
′:2
U,σ ,τ + . . .+
nt−1
∑
t ′=1
Pt
′:2
U,σ ,τ (A.2)
+Pt:2U,σ ′,τ ′+P
2t:2
U,σ ′,τ ′+ . . .+P
(n−1)t:2
U,σ ′,τ ′ (A.3)
= n(t−1)Q+
n−1
∑
b=1
Pbt:2U,σ ′,τ ′ . (A.4)
Note that every term in ∑n−1b=1 P
bt:2
U,σ ′,τ ′ denotes the distribution of two consecutive action triples at a tran-
sition point from one block of t stages to the next.
We can now show for every n ∈ N that the distance between Q and Q′ in the L1-norm converges to zero
as t→ ∞:
Since
Q′ = n(t−1)nt−1 Q+
1
nt−1
n−1
∑
b=1
Pbt:2U,σ ′,τ ′ ,
we have ∥∥Q−Q′∥∥≤(1− n− nt
n− 1t
)
‖Q‖+ 1
nt+1
∥∥∥∥∥n−1∑b=1 Pbt:2U,σ ′,τ ′
∥∥∥∥∥ .
Hence, since both terms on the right-hand side in the expression above converge to 0 as t→∞, the result
follows.
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Appendix B
Complementary Results for Chapter 2 in
Part 1
Proposition 3. Let µ ∈ ∆(I) be a convex combinations of two distributions µ0,µ1 ∈ ∆(I), i.e., µ =
β0µ0 +β1µ1 and let X ∼ µ . Furthermore, denote by Y a binary indicator variable with the following
property: let X ∼ µ0, if Y = 0 and let X ∼ µ1, if Y = 1. Then,
β0D(µ0||µ)+β1D(µ1||µ)≤ H(Y )
with D(·||·) denoting the Kullback-Leibler distance.
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Proof.
β0D(µ0||µ)+β1D(µ1||µ) = β0∑
x∈I
µ0(x)(log(µ0(x))− log(µ(x)))
+β1∑
x∈I
µ1(x)(log(µ1(x))− log(µ(x)))
=−∑
x∈I
(β0µ0+β1µ1)(x) log(µ(x))
+β0∑
x∈I
µ0(x) log(µ0(x))+β1∑
x∈I
µ1(x) log(µ1(x))
=−∑
x∈I
µ(x) log(µ(x))−β0H(µ0)−β1H(µ1)
= H(X)−H(X |Y )
= H(Y )−H(Y |X)
≤ H(Y )
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Appendix C
Complementary Results for Chapter 3 in
Part 1
C.1 Approximation of Probabilities
Lemma 16. Let µ ∈ ∆(I) be a distribution with full support. For all ε > 0 and for all P′2 ∈ ∆(A2)
(A = I × J×K) with P′2(i|a) = µ(i), for all i ∈ I and a ∈ A, identical marginals P′ on A, and with
HP′2(i, j|k, i′, j′,k′)≥ HP′2(µ), ∃P2 ∈ δ (A2) with full support, s.t.
HP2(i, j|k, i′, j′,k′)−H(µ)≥ ε (C.1)
and ∥∥P2−P′2∥∥1 ≤ 2ε (C.2)
Proof. Fix ε > 0. Denote by PI the marginal of P on I. Observe, that since P′2(i|a) = µ(i), it also holds
that the marginal of P′ on I, PI , is equal to µ .
Let R = (P′I ×UJ×UK) and R2 = R×R, where UJ and UK denote the uniform distribution on J and K
respectively, define P2 = εR2 +(1− ε)P′2. Observe, that P2 has full support (since R2 has full support)
and it holds that P2(i|a) = µ(i), for all i ∈ I and a ∈ A.
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Now, by the concavity of the entropy function P2 7→ HP2(i, j|k, i′, j′,k′), it holds that
HP2(i, j|k, i′, j′,k′)≥ εHR2(i, j|k, i′, j′,k′)+(1− ε)HP′2(i, j|k, i′, j′,k′)
≥ εHR2(i)+ ε log2 |J|+(1− ε)H(µ)
= ε+H(µ).
Hence, it follows that
HP2(i, j|k, i′, j′,k′)−H(µ)≥ ε.
Furthermore,
∥∥P2−P′2∥∥1 = ∥∥εR2+(1− ε)P′2−P′2∥∥ (C.3)
= ε
∥∥R2−P′2∥∥ (C.4)
≤ 2ε. (C.5)
C.2 Locally Typical Sequences
Lemma 17. If N > 2lε , then every l-locally typical sequence x
N ∈ T εN,l(P) is 2ε-typical, i.e.,
| 1N N(a|xN)−P(a)|< 2ε ∀a ∈ A.
Proof. Let xN ∈ T εN,l(P). First, let N = ql, 1≤ q ∈ N. Then, for every a ∈ A:
|N(a|xN)−NP(a)|=
∣∣∣∣∣q−1∑t=0(N(a|xNtl+1,l)− lP(a))
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
q−1
∑
t=0
|N(a|xNtl+1,l)− lP(a)|
< qlε,
where the last inequality follows directly from the definition of l-locally typical sequences.
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Now, let N = ql + ld , with 0 < ld < l. Denote by xql the first ql coordinates and by xld the last ld
coordinates of xN . Then,
|N(a|xN)−nP(a)|= |N(a|xql)−qlP(a)+N(a|xld )− ldP(a)|
≤ |N(a|xql)−qlP(a)|+ |N(a|xld )− ldP(a)|. (C.6)
From above, we know that |N(a|xql)−qlP(a)|< qlε . Furthermore, we have
|N(a|xld )− ldP(a)|< l(1+ 1ε )ε,
since for every t ∈ (1, . . . ,N− l),
N(a|xld )− ldP(a)≤ N(a|xNt,l)
< l(P(a)+ ε)
< l(1+ ε)
= l(1+ 1ε )ε,
and
N(a|xld )− ldP(a)>−ldP(a)
>−l
>−l(1+ 1ε )ε.
Returning to inequality (C.6), we conclude
|N(a|xN)−NP(a)|< qlε+ l(1+ 1ε )ε,
and for N large enough, i.e., N > l(1+ 1ε ), or, more generously, for N >
2l
ε , we have
|N(a|xn)−NP(a)|< 2Nε.
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The following Corollary follows directly from the above Lemma C.2 and from the property of ε-typical
sequences (stated in the Preliminaries):
Corollary 6. Let Xn = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xn) be an i.i.d. sequence with Xi ∼ P. Denote by xn a realization of
Xn. If xn ∈ T εn,l(P), and if n > 2lε , then
2−n(H(X)+2cε) ≤ Pn(xn)≤ 2−n(H(X)−2cε),
where Pn denotes the product distribution derived from P and c =−∑a∈A logP(a).
Lemma 18. Let X1,X2, . . . be drawn i.i.d according to P ∈ ∆(A) and let Xn = (X1, . . . ,Xn). Then, for
every l > ln(2n|A|)2ε2 , we have
lim
n→∞Pr(X
n ∈ T εn,l(P)) = 1.
Proof. First, note that
Pr(Xn ∈ T εn,l(P)) = Pr(∀t ∈ (1, . . . ,n− l) : Xnt,l ∈ T εl (P))
= 1−Pr(∃t ∈ (1, . . . ,n− l) : Xnt,l /∈ T εl (P))
= 1−Pr(
n−l⋃
t=1
Xnt,l /∈ T εl (P))
≥ 1−
n−l
∑
t=1
Pr(Xnt,l /∈ T εl (P))
Furthermore, for every t ∈ (1, . . . ,n− l),
Pr(Xnt,l /∈ T εl (P)) = Pr(∃a ∈ A : |1l N(a|xnt,l)−P(a)| ≥ ε)
= Pr(
⋃
a∈A
|1l N(a|xnt,l)−P(a)| ≥ ε)
≤ ∑
a∈A
Pr(|1l N(a|xnt,l)−P(a)| ≥ ε)
≤ |A|2exp(−2lε2),
where the last inequality is a direct application of Hoeffding’s inequality.
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Therefore,
n−l
∑
t=1
Pr(Xnt,l /∈ T εn,l(P))≤
n−l
∑
t=1
|A|2exp(−2lε2)
= (n− l)|A|2exp(−2lε2)
→ 0 as n→ ∞,
and the last expression goes to 0 as n→∞ for every l >√n, or, in dependence of ε , for every l > ln(2n|A|)2ε2 .
This completes the proof.
Corollary 7. Let X ∼ P and set c =−∑a∈A logP(a). Let n, l be integers with n > 2lε and l > ln(2n|A|)2ε2 . If
n is sufficiently large, then
(1−δ )2n(H(X)−2cε) ≤ |T εn,l(P)| ≤ 2n(H(X)+2cε),
for every δ > 0.
Proof. Since
Pr(Xn ∈ T εn,l(P)) = ∑
xn∈T εn,l(P)
Pn(xn),
with
2−n(H(X)+2cε) ≤ Pn(xn)≤ 2−n(H(X)−2cε)
(by Corollary 6), we get
∑
xn∈T εn,l(P)
2−n(H(X)+2cε) ≤ Pr(Xn ∈ T εn,l(P))≤ ∑
xn∈T εn,l(P)
2−n(H(X)−2cε),
equivalently,
2−n(H(X)+2cε)|T εn,l(P)| ≤ Pr(Xn ∈ T εn,l(P))≤ 2−n(H(X)−2cε)|T εn,l(P)|.
By Lemma 18, we know that for n sufficiently large the following relation holds for every δ > 0:
1−δ ≤ Pr(Xn ∈ T εn,l(P))≤ 1,
and so the result follows.
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C.3 Results on Locally Conditional Typical Sequences
We derive a couple of very helpful properties of locally conditional typical sequences.
Lemma 19. Let xn ∈ T εn,l(PI). Then, if n > 2lε , every locally conditional typical sequence yn ∈ T εn,l(P|xn)
is conditionally 2ε-typical, i.e., for every (i,k) ∈ I×K the following holds:
|N(i,k|xn,yn)−ρ i(k)N(i|xn)|< 2nε.
Remark 26. Observe that in Definition 10 we assumed P to have full support. This assumptions sim-
plifies the Definition of conditional ε-typical sequences slightly, since for all (i,k) ∈ I×K, it holds that
ρ i(k)> 0. 
Proof of Lemma 19. The proof of Lemma 19 is very similar in structure to the proof of Lemma 4. There-
fore, we only provide a sketch of the proof and highlight the parts that slightly differ.
Let xn ∈ T PIn,l . Recall, that this means that for every t ∈ (1, . . . ,(n− l)) and for every i ∈ I the following
inequality holds:
N(i|xnt,l)< l(ε+PI(i)). (C.7)
Similar to the proof of Lemma 4, we first assume n = ql, with q ∈ N and q ≥ 1. It then trivially holds,
that for all (i,k) ∈ I×K,
|N(i,k|xn,yn)−ρ i(k)N(i|xn)|< nε. (C.8)
We now set n = ql+ ld with 0 < ld < l and denote by (xql,yql) the first ql coordinates and by (xld ,yld )
the last ld coordinates of (xn,yn). By the triangle inequality, we have for all (i,k) ∈ I×K
|N(i,k|xn,yn)−ρ i(k)N(i|xn)| ≤ |N(i,k|xql,yql)−ρ i(k)N(i|xql)|
+ |N(i,k|xld ,yld )−ρ i(k)N(i|xld )|.
Since by inequality C.8 we have
|N(i,k|xql,yql)−ρ i(k)N(i|xql)|< qlε,
it remains to bound |N(i,k|xld ,yld )−ρ i(k)N(i|xld )|.
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In the same manner as in the proof of Lemma 4 and taking into account inequality C.7, we can show
|N(i,k|xld ,yld )−ρ i(k)N(i|xld )|< l(2+ 1ε )ε.
From here, we can directly deduce the desired lower bound for |N(i,k|xn,yn)− ρ i(k)N(i|xn)| for n >
2l
ε .
Similar to Corollary 6, the following corollary can now be directly deduced from Lemma 19 and from
the remark about conditional ε-typical sequences occurring, stated in the Preliminaries:
Corollary 8. Let xn ∈ T εn,l(PI) and let Y1,Y2, . . . be random variables in Kn distributed according to{
ρ i : i ∈ I} and xn, i.e., Pr(Yj = k) = ρx j(k), for every j ≥ 1. Denote by yn a realization of Y n =
(Y1, . . . ,Yn). If yn ∈ T εn,l(P|xn) and c′ = ∑(i,k)∈I×K(logρ i(k)−ρ i(k) logρ i(k)), and if n > 2lε , then
2−n(H(k|i)+2c
′ε) ≤ Pn(yn|xn)≤ 2−n(H(k|i)−2c′ε),
where Pn(yn|xn) =∏nj=1ρx j(y j).
Again, similar to Lemma 18, we can make the following statement about a random sequence Y n that is
distributed according to
{
ρ i : i ∈ I} and xn:
Lemma 20. Let xn ∈ T εn,l(PI) and let Y1,Y2, . . . be independent random variables distributed according
to
{
ρ i : i ∈ I} and xn. Let Y n = (Y1, . . . ,Yn), then, for every l > ln(2n|A|)2ε2 ,
lim
n→∞Pr(Y
n ∈ T εn,l(P|xn)) = 1.
Proof. The proof of this lemma is similar in structure to the proof of Lemma 18. It remains to show the
following: let Y l = Y1, . . . ,Yl denote a subsequence of Y n of length l, and let xl ∈ T εl (PI). Then,
Pr(Y l /∈ T εl (P|xl))≤ |I||J|2exp(−2lε2). (C.9)
To prove the above inequality, we first order the sequence xl according to the set I, i.e., we write
xl = x1, . . . ,x1,︸ ︷︷ ︸
N(x1|xl)
x2, . . . ,x2,︸ ︷︷ ︸
N(x2|xl)
. . .x|I|, . . . ,x|I|,︸ ︷︷ ︸
N(x|I||xl)
.
106
Now, according to the order of xl , we group together those random variables in Y l , that have the same
conditioning event, i.e.,
Y l = Y N(x1|x
l),Y N(x2|x
l), . . . ,Y N(x|I||x
l),
where for every x ∈ I, Y N(x|xl) = Y x1 , . . . ,Y xN(x|xl) is now an i.i.d. sequence with Y xk ∼ P(·|x), for all
k ∈ (1, . . . ,N(x|xl)). Now, the event Y l ∈ T εl (P|xl) is equivalent to the event that for all x ∈ I, Y N(x|x
l) ∈
T εN(x|xl)(P(·|x)). Therefore, the following holds:
Pr(Y l /∈ T εl (P|xl)) = Pr
(
∃(x,y) ∈ I× J :
∣∣∣∣∣N(y|Y N(x|x
l))
N(x|xl) −P(y|x)
∣∣∣∣∣≥ ε
)
≤ ∑
x,y∈I×J
Pr
(∣∣∣∣∣N(y|Y N(x|x
l))
N(x|xl) −P(y|x)
∣∣∣∣∣≥ ε
)
≤ |I||J|2exp(−2lε2),
where the last inequality is again a direct application of the Hoeffding inequality. This can be easily seen
as follows. Since
N(y|Y N(x|xl))
N(x|xl) =
1
N(x|xl)
N(x|xl)
∑
k=1
1{Y xk =y},
and since Y x1 , . . . ,Y
x
N(x|xl) is an i.i.d. sequence with law P(·|x),
E
[
1
N(x|xl)
N(x|xl)
∑
k=1
1{Y xk =y}
]
= P(y|x),
the result follows from the Hoeffding inequality.
Finally, we can deduce the following result w.r.t. a conditional ε-typical set:
Corollary 9. Let xn ∈ T εn,l(PI) and let n > 2lε . For n sufficiently large,
(1−δ ′)2n(H(k|i)−2c′ε) ≤ |T εl,n(P|xn)| ≤ 2n(H(k|i)+2c
′ε),
for every δ ′ > 0 and with c′ = ∑(i,k)∈I×K(logρ i(k)−ρ i(k) logρ i(k)).
Proof. The proof follows the exact same structure as the proof of Corollary 7.
107
C.4 Mapping a Strictly Positive Stochastic Matrix to its unique Station-
ary Distribution
In this section we add the proof of Lemma 21, which is stated below for completeness.
Lemma 21. Let A be a finite set and denote byM the set of all strictly positive stochastic matrices over
A. The mapping f :M → ∆(A), with f (P) = pi , where P ∈M with (unique) stationary distribution pi ,
is continuous.
Proof. Let P denote a strictly positive stochastic matrix and let {Xk}=X0,X2, . . . be a markov chain with
transitions according to P and with initial distribution ν ∈ ∆(A) (given as a column probability vector),
i.e., X0 ∼ ν . For every k > 0, let gνk be a function from M , the set of all strictly positive stochastic
matrices, to ∆(A), with gνk (P) = ν
TPk (where νT denotes the transpose of ν). Note, that gνk (P) describes
the distribution of the kth coordinate of the markov chain {Xk}, since Xk ∼ νTPk. Furthermore, it is well
known that for every distribution ν ∈ ∆(A) and for every P ∈M it holds that
lim
k→∞
gνk (P) = f (P)
(see, for instance, Chapter 1.8 in [11]). With f being the limit of the functions
{
gνk
}
k, it is sufficient to
show that the functions
{
gνk
}
k converge uniformly to f in a neighborhood of P. Since each function g
ν
k
is continuous, it then follows from the uniform limit theorem that f is continuous. Hence, it is sufficient
to show the following claim:
Claim 3. For every distribution ν ∈ ∆(A) and for every P ∈M with stationary distribution pi , we have
for every k > 0,
‖gνk (P)− f (P)‖TV ≤ (1− p)k,
where p = mini, j∈A p(i, j).
We prove the claim via a coupling argument (coupling methods are introduced e.g., in Chapter 4 in [8]):
in addition to {Xk}, let {Yk} denote another markov chains with transition matrix P. We have X0 ∼ ν and
we set Y0 ∼ pi , where pi is the stationary distribution of P. Define a coupling {Xk,Yk}k of these chains as
follows. Let t ≥ 0 denote the first time the two markov chains meet. Then, for all k ≥ t, let Xk = Yk and
for all k ≤ t, assume Xk and Yk to be independent. Obviously, the bivariate chain {Xk,Yk}k is a Markov
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Chain over state space A×A that has a transition matrix Q with entries q((a′,b′),(a,b)) that satisfy
q((a′,b′),(a,b)) =

p(a′,a)p(b′,b) if a′ 6= b′
p(a′,a) if a′ = b′ and a = b
0 if a′ = b′ and a 6= b.
Recall, that Xk ∼ νTPk and we write νTPk(a) = Pr(Xk = a), for all a ∈ A. Furthermore, since pi is the
stationary distribution of P, Yk ∼ pi for every k ≥ 0. Therefore, for all a ∈ A,
νTPk(a)−pi(a) = Pr(Xk = a)−Pr(Yk = a)
= Pr(Xk = a, t ≤ k)+Pr(Xk = a, t > k)
− (Pr(Yk = a, t ≤ k)+Pr(Yk = a, t > k))
= Pr(Xk = a, t > k)−Pr(Yk = a, t > k)
≤ Pr(t > k)
= Pr(Xk 6= Yk),
where the third equality follows since Xk = Yk for all t ≤ k.
Since νTPk = gνk (P), our results so far summarize to
‖gνk (P)−pi‖TV ≤ Pr(Xk 6= Yk). (C.10)
Now, by construction of the coupling, Pr(Xk 6= Yk|Xk−1 = Yk−1) = 0, hence,
Pr(Xk 6= Yk) = Pr(Xk−1 6= Yk−1)Pr(Xk 6= Yk|Xk−1 6= Yk−1).
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Furthermore, for every (b,c) ∈ A2, b 6= c,
Pr(Xk = Yk|Xk−1 = b,Yk−1 = c) = ∑
a∈A
q((b,c),(a,a))
= ∑
a∈A
p(b,a)p(c,a)
> p,
and thus Pr(Xk = Yk|Xk−1 6= Yk−1)> p.
The claim now follows from
Pr(Xk 6= Yk)< Pr(Xk−1 6= Yk−1)(1− p)
< (1− p)k
and from inequality (C.10).
C.5 The Existence and the Size of the Set of Action Plans - with Locally
Typical Sequences
The next Theorem provides the key to prove the size of the set of action plans of the agent in Lemma 8:
Theorem 7. Let P ∈ ∆(I×K) be a distribution with marginals PI on I and PK on K. Let (i,k) denote
a pair of random variables distributed according to P. For any fixed ξ > 0, let M = 2N(H(k)−H(k|i)+ξ )
and let S = {s1,s2, . . .sM} be a set of i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed in T εn,l(PK). Now, the
probability that for every locally typical sequence xn ∈ T εN,l(PI), there is at least one element s ∈ S, s.t.
(x,s) ∈ T εN,l(P) goes to 1 as n→ ∞, i.e.,
lim
n→∞Pr(∀x
n ∈ T εn,l(PI)∃s ∈ S : (x,s) ∈ T εl,n(P)) = 1
Proof. We show
lim
n→∞Pr(∃x
n ∈ T εn,l(PI) : ∀s ∈ S : (x,s) /∈ T εn,l(P)) = 0.
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First, applying the union bound, we have
Pr(∃xn ∈ T εn,l(PI) : ∀s ∈ S : (xn,s) /∈ T εn,l(P)) = Pr(
⋃
xn∈T εn,l(PI)
∀s ∈ S : (xn,s) /∈ T εn,l(P))
≤ ∑
xn∈T εn,l(PI)
Pr(∀s ∈ S : (xn,s) /∈ T εn,l(P))
= ∑
xn∈T εn,l(PI)
Pr(
M⋂
i=1
si /∈ T εn,l(P|xn))
= ∑
xn∈T εn,l(PI)
M
∏
i=1
Pr(si /∈ T εn,l(P|xn))
= ∑
xn∈T εn,l(PI)
M
∏
i=1
(
1−Pr(si ∈ T εn,l(P|xn)
)
)
< |T εn,l(PI)|
(
1−Pr(s1 ∈ T εn,l(P|x¯n)
)
)M,
where the last inequality holds since Pr(si ∈ T εn,l(P|xn)) is identical for all i ∈ (1, . . . ,M) and x¯n =
argmaxxn∈T εn,l(PI)∏
M
i=1
(
1−Pr(si ∈ T εn,l(P|xn))
)
. Now, observe that for any 0 < α < 1, we have (1−
α)
1
α < e−1. Furthermore, recall that from Corollary 7, |T εn,l(PI)| ≤ 2n(H(i)+2cε) with c =−∑i∈I logPI(i)
hence with α = Pr(s1 ∈ T εn,l(P|x¯n)) we have
|T εn,l(PI)|
(
1−Pr(s1 ∈ T εn,l(P|x¯n)
)
)M = |T εn,l(PI)|(1−α)M
= |T εn,l(PI)|
(
(1−α) 1α
)αM
< |T εn,l(PI)|exp(−αM)
< 2n(H(i)+2cε) exp(−αM).
Since
α = Pr(s1 ∈ T εn,l(P|x¯n)) =
|T εn,l(P|x¯n)|
|T εn,l(PK)|
,
we can apply Corollaries 7 and 9 with c′ =∑i,k∈I×K logρ i(k)(1−ρ i(k)) and c˜=−∑k∈K logPK(k) to get
α =
|T εn,l(P|x¯n)|
|T εn,l(PK)|
≥ (1−δ
′)2n(H(k|i)−2c′ε)
2n(H(k)+2c˜ε)
= (1−δ ′)2n(H(k|i)−H(i)−2ε(c′+c˜))
> (1−δ ′)2n(H(k|i)−H(i)−2ε c˜)
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(note that c′ < 0).Hence, with M = 2n(H(k)−H(k|i)+ξ ) for ξ > 2ε c˜,
αM ≥ (1−δ ′)2n(H(k|i)−H(i)−2ε(c′+c˜))2n(H(k)−H(k|i)+ξ )
= (1−δ ′)2n(ξ−2ε c˜),
therefore
2n(H(i)+2cε) exp(−αM)→ 0 as n→ ∞,
and hence
lim
n→∞Pr(∃x ∈ T
ε
n,l(PI) : ∀s ∈ S : (x,s) /∈ T εn,l(P)) = 0.
This completes the proof.
C.6 m-Extendable Locally Conditional Typical Sequences
In the following, we prove important properties of m-extendable locally typical conditional sequences
which play an important role for the size of the message set of the forecaster.
First, consider the following observation that applies Lemma 20 to m-extendable locally typical condi-
tional sequences:
Observation 7. Let n,m, l ∈ N be integers with n,m > l and let xn+m ∈ T εn+m,l(PI). Assume Y n+m =
(Y1, . . . ,Yn+m) is a sequence of independent random variables with Yi ∼ P(·|xi) for every i ∈ (1, . . . ,n+
m). We refer to Y n = (Y1, . . . ,Yn) as the prefix of Y n+m. Then, for every l ∈ N with l > ln(2n|A|)2ε2 and l >
ln(2m|A|)
2ε2 , the probability that the prefix of Y
n+m is an m-extendable locally conditional typical sequence
converges to 1, i.e., it holds that
lim
n→∞Pr(Y
n ∈ T εn,l(P|xn,ext(m))) = 1.

The following Theorem applies Lemma 20 and Observation 7 and provides a vital result to deduce the
size of an m-extendable locally typical set.
Theorem 8. Let (X ,Y )∼ P, fix ε > 0 and xn ∈ T εn,l(PI). Let the integers n,m, l and the random sequence
Y n+m have the same properties as in Observation 7. Denote by EXT the event that the prefix of Y n+m is
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extendable, i.e., EXT = Y n ∈ T εn,l(P|xn,ext(m)). Then,
1
n H(Y
n|EXT )→ H(Y |X)−2εd, as n→ ∞,
with d = ∑a∈I H(Y |X = a).
Proof. First, we show
H(Y n)> n(H(Y |X)−2εd).
Since Y n is a sequence of independent random variables, it holds that
H(Y n) =
n
∑
i=1
H(Yi)
=
n
∑
i=1
(−∑
y∈J
P(y|xi) logP(y|xi))
=
n
∑
i=1
H(Y |X = xi), (C.11)
where xi ∈ I is the i-th element in the locally typical sequence xn ∈ T εn,l(PI). Since P has full support, it
also holds that for every element a ∈ I, we have N(a|xn) > n(P(a)− 2ε). Now, we group the last sum
(C.11) into sums of entropies with the same conditioning event:
n
∑
i=1
H(Y |X = xi) =∑
a∈I
∑
i:xi=a
H(Y |X = xi)
=∑
a∈I
N(a|xn)H(Y |X = a)
>∑
a∈I
n(P(a)−2ε)H(Y |X = a)
= n
(
∑
a∈I
P(a)H(Y |X = a)−2ε∑
a∈I
H(Y |X = a)
)
= n(H(Y |X)−2ε∑
a∈I
H(Y |X = a)),
which completes the first part of the proof.
Next, let 1{EXT} denote a random indicator function with Pr(1{EXT} = 1) = Pr(EXT ) and Pr(1{EXT} =
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0) = Pr(EXT c), where EXT c denotes the complement of EXT , i.e., Y n /∈ T εn,l(P|xn,ext(m)). Then,
H(Y n|1{EXT}) = Pr(EXT )H(Y n|1{EXT} = 1)+Pr(EXT c)H(Y n|1{EXT} = 0)
= Pr(EXT )H(Y n|EXT )+Pr(EXT c)H(Y n|EXT c).
Furthermore, by the chain rule of conditional entropy, we have
H(Y n|1{EXT}) = H(Y n,1{EXT})−H(1{EXT}),
therefore,
Pr(EXT )H(Y n|EXT ) = H(Y n,1{EXT})−H(1{EXT})−Pr(EXT c)H(Y n|EXT c).
Now, since H(1{EXT})≤ log2 2 = 1, H(Y n|EXT c)≤ n log |J| and
H(Y n,1{EXT})≥ H(Y n), we get
1
n H(Y
n|EXT )≥ H(Y
n)
nPr(EXT )
− (1+Pr(EXT
c)n log |J|)
nPr(EXT )
>
(H(Y |X)−2εd)
Pr(EXT )
− (1+Pr(EXT
c)n log |J|)
nPr(EXT )
.
By Observation 7, Pr(EXT )→ 1 as n→ ∞, hence we can conclude that
1
n H(Y
n|EXT )→ H(Y |X)−2εd as n→ ∞.
Corollary 10 (The Size of T εn,l(P|xn,ext(m))). Let ε > 0. Then, for every δ > 0 and n sufficiently large,
we have
|T εn,l(P|xn,ext(m))|> 2n(H(Y |X)−2εd−δ )
Proof. The statement follows immediately from Theorem 8 and from the fact that
H(Y n|EXT )≤ log2 |T εn,l(P|xn,ext(m))|.
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